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Introduction
Development involves change. But many development initiatives produce unimpressive 
levels of change in targeted countries, organizations and outcomes. This is the case in 
social sector initiatives,
i core public management reforms,
ii and even macroeconomic 
adjustment operations.
iii Change is often limited even when countries adopt proposed 
solutions in their proposed forms, in apparently good faith and on time (or in reasonable 
time).
iv We wonder why, and believe research should ask how to close the gap between 
the change intended in development (what is proposed) and the change we actually see in 
evidence. This research paper aims to (modestly) contribute to such research by exploring 
what it takes to get change done; and particularly what role leadership plays in effecting 
change.
The first section briefly discusses literature on change in large organizations and proposes 
a simple change space model for understanding change and its limits. The model posits 
that organizational and social change emerges when there is acceptance, authority (and 
accountability) and ability to allow and catalyze ongoing as well as episodic adjustments. 
This space is required to ensure contextual readiness for change and to foster progression 
through different stages of the change process. 
Change space must fit the specific change content and, we argue, emerges more 
organically to ensure such fit when change content emerges through problem solving 
(instead of as solutions provided from the outside). The lack of change space in many 
development contexts often goes ignored, contributing to developmental failures: Projects 
and interventions generally call for more and different space than is available, do nothing 
to enhance or shape the space (depending rather on what Nutt (1986) calls 
“implementation by edicts” of pre-determined solutions) and fail as a result. Often, as 
Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) muse, these solutions become future problems.  
The second section asks what role leadership plays in the change process (particularly in 
facilitating the creation of change space) given that there is an almost universal 
agreement that agents play an important part. The answer must go beyond “being a 
champion” and “providing political will”—two common refrains used in development to 
reference leadership. In looking for an answer, we raise basic but key questions: Who is 
seen as the change leader? Why? What do leaders do to effect change? How? Tackling 
these questions with reference to literature, we posit some propositions about how 
leadership manifests and matters in the change process: 
 Leadership is more about groups than individuals, given that there are likely to be 
multiple people exercising leadership in any successful change event.
 ‘Leaders’ are identified more because of their functional contribution to change than 
their personal traits or authority (and the ‘connecting’ function stands out).
 Leadership contributes to change when it builds change space—where leaders foster 
acceptance for change, grant authority to change (with accountability), and introduce 
or free the abilities necessary to achieve change. Change space is especially enhanced 
where leadership facilitates open access societies and learning organizations in which 
members are empowered—in groups—to pursue change through problem solving.
 Leadership manifests in different ways in different contexts, depending on contextual 
readiness and factors that shape change and leadership opportunities; but the key 4
characteristics of plurality, functionality, problem orientation and change space 
creation are likely to be common to all successful leadership-led change events.
Section three introduces an empirical study we conducted to investigate these 
propositions in the development context. It begins by pointing out that some development 
interventions do already propose leadership-led change, introducing brief examples 
captured by the multi-donor Global Leadership Initiative (GLI).
v  We examined what
leadership looked like in the change processes of fourteen such interventions (in eight 
different developing countries) where we conducted over140 in-depth structured 
interviews as the primary source of data. We focus on fragile countries, coming out of 
conflict, facing tense government transitions, and so forth, because we see these as 
extreme cases where expressions of leadership-led change will stand out. Recent work 
(including Collier, 2007) argues that these countries are in a development trap, 
characterized by recurring conflict and tension and low growth; there is a dearth of 
leadership and leadership-led change that promotes shared growth and development. 
Section four presents results from the selected case studies, and discusses these in relation 
to our theoretical propositions. Our analysis provides support for our propositions and the 
idea that leadership and leadership-led interventions can have an impact on change space 
and ultimately on change, even in these complex contexts. We conclude with 
recommendations for those in development, centered on the idea that development is 
about leadership-led change:
 Leadership is a key to effecting change and promoting development.
 Leadership interventions should focus on building functional groups of leaders—in 
teams, coalitions and networks—around unifying problems.
 Leadership interventions should always be focused on creating change space rather 
than creating leaders as an end.
 Leadership interventions must be fitted to context but consistently emphasize 
leadership plurality, functionality, problem orientation and change space creation.
Development as change
Development initiatives often disappoint in terms of final results. Interestingly, we find 
that organizational change frequently fails in the private sector as well. Gilley (2005, 4) 
cites various studies showing that one half to two-thirds of major corporate change 
initiatives (and 50 to 80 percent of reengineering efforts) are failures,
vi less than 40 
percent of these produce positive change, and one third actually make the situation worse.
Other studies find “initiative decay” in change processes, where gains from change are 
either never realized or lost because new practices or approaches are abandoned.
vii
Basically, then, change is difficult everywhere, and answers about how to do change 
cannot be assumed as intuitive or well known. Especially when the goal is for substantive 
change where, “Not only have the process and outcome changed, but the thinking and 
attitudes behind them are fundamentally altered and the systems surrounding them are 
transformed in support” (NHS Modernization Agency 2002, 12)
The organizational change literature offers a ubiquitous set of ideas on why change often 
fails and how to do it better.
viii It is impossible to do the entire literature justice, but some 
lines of thought do recur across many studies and allow for fairly generalized application. 5
In this section we build on dominant discussion lines (about change context, process and 
content)
ix in proposing a model to think about achieving change and development. The 
next section asks how leadership engagements fit into such model.  
Context and the importance of change space
Change seldom happens in a void or against a clean slate where all options are on the 
table and possible to adopt. There is always a set of contextual issues to consider, 
manifest in an entity’s external and internal environment. Some call this the political 
economy context;
x others refer to the historical or institutional setting.
xi Kurt Lewin 
(1951) described a ‘force field’ of driving and limiting factors in which organizations 
operate. Change requirements arise in this force field but change is also limited by it. We 
discuss both aspects of contextual influence: on what change is needed and the challenge 
of effecting change. 
While most theorists agree that change opportunities (or needs) emerge because of some 
tension in the organizational context,
xii there is disagreement about how and how 
regularly this happens and what challenges are created for effecting successful change:
xiii
 Some hold that organizations tend to settle into semi-permanent equilibriums 
facilitated by well balanced, stabilizing internal and external factors. Shocks 
periodically destabilize the equilibrium, threatening the organization’s survival and 
requiring it to adjust. Organizations resist internal change even in the face of 
disturbance, however, and such contextual inertia demands corrective intervention—
the basis of episodic change. 
 Some present change differently, however, as continuous, “ongoing, evolving and 
cumulative” along historical paths of constantly shifting equilibriums that makes
stability a dynamic challenge (Weick and Quinn 1999, 375, 379). Change in this 
approach involves constant “accommodations, adaptations, and alterations” which 
lead to fundamental evolution over time (Orlikowski 1996, 66). The challenge is to 
constantly redirect what is already in place to ensure long-run adaptability to 
context—rather than effecting major episodic adaptations to shocks.
We believe that change actually has elements of both episodic and continuous models,
xiv
and that the common challenge is to identify (and create) the capacity for organizational 
and social change given contextual pressures (episodic and ongoing). We refer to this as 
change space which we liken to the idea of an organism’s fitness to adapt to evolutionary 
challenges. Just as a biological organism’s adaptive ability depends on its genetic 
makeup, we hold that organizational and social capacity to change depends on the space 
to identify change, shift focus towards change demands, and embrace new forms and 
functions that aid progress and development. Organizations and systems with limited 
change space lack the wherewithal to manage contextual adjustment and fail to change; 
just as low fitness organisms fail to evolve and ultimately perish.
xv     
There are various antecedents to the idea that the contextual space in which change 
happens matters—and that active engagement is required to understand this space and to 
(sometimes) engineer extra space for change. Related work reflects on the importance of 
space in organizational
xvi and social and economic system
xvii change and we (perhaps 
uncomfortably) speak interchangeably of both in this paper—primarily because we feel 
development challenges occur in both and our arguments have dual application. Drawing 6
from the literature
xviii and building on our own prior thinking, Figure 1 illustrates a basic 
change space model incorporating three factors we see as centrally influencing 
organizational and social capacities to adjust to contextual demands: Acceptance, 
Authority (and accountability) and Ability (Andrews 2004, 2008b). 
Figure 1. The AAA model of change space
No change space exists because the AAA’s are 
all deficient and/or non-convergent
Some change space exists because the AAA’s 
are all sufficient in size and converge
     Source: Adapted from Andrews (2004, 2008b).
Ability
Authority /
Accountability
Acceptance
?
Ability Authority / 
Accountability
Acceptance
By acceptance we combine what others variously term ‘mindset’, ‘political will’, ‘buy-
in’, ‘ownership’ etc. in regard to the beliefs agents have about change (as in, “I accept we 
need change”) and formal commitments to change (as in legal acceptance of a 
contract).
xix  Change requires acceptance (a belief-based commitment) by affected agents 
in the change context, of various change aspects. Change also requires appropriate 
authority and accountability structures that influence whether and how agents develop 
and act on change beliefs, commitments and needs. These structures constitute key 
contextual influences on the change space, and have both formal and informal 
manifestations (laws and codes and norms of appropriateness, social conventions and the 
like).
xx Change space is also influenced by the ability profile of a particular organization 
or society. Change generally requires abilities or resources and a context may be 
constrained by the amount of fiscal, human and/or informational abilities available, or by 
the degree to which latent resources are given free expression in exploring, pursuing and 
implementing change. 
Figure 1 shows that change space emerges at the intersection of these three factors, where 
there is some congruency in Acceptance, Authority (and accountability) and Ability, 
catalyzing and allowing change.
xxi The change space might not exist in some contexts—
fundamentally prohibiting change; or it might be limited—allowing only peripheral 
change across an organization or system or change in only one part of the system; or it 
might be substantial—accommodating a response to contextual challenges that allows 
full organizational adaptation. Given such thinking, we believe that the change space 7
model helps one think about contextual challenges of both episodic and continuous 
change approaches as well as contextual limits common to development: 
 Organizational inertia is often identified in contexts where we see weak acceptance of 
a change need and entrenched authority structures, for example, while continuous 
adaptation to environmental pressure is constrained where organizations do not accept 
the need or authorize activities to consistently scan the environment and test norms.
xxii
 Narrow political elites in developing countries often adapt better to shocks and 
through episodic change than the general citizenry because elites control political 
authorizing structures (often over key ability factors) and hence enjoy more change 
space to pursue policies and solutions that serve their accepted interests.
xxiii
 In contrast, the context of more developed open access societies generally allows 
greater change space, ongoing and episodic, where more agents have authority, access 
and freedom to express ability, and a holding space to learn and build acceptance. In 
our model, this expanded space facilitates more successful adaptation over time for 
larger portions of the population.
xxiv Figure 2 illustrates this kind of society in the 
‘large change space’ for change, contrasted with more limited change space contexts. 
Figure 2. Contextual change demands, contextual change space, and results
Contextual change 
demands
Contextual change 
space Change results
Episodic shocks
Continual adjustment 
pressures
Large change space
Substantial change towards new 
equilibrium , elevating development path
Small change space
Limited change, major disequilibrium 
persists, undermining development path
Large change space
Consistent adjustments, dynamic 
evolution, elevating development path
Small change space
Limited adjustments and stagnant 
development path, threats to survival
Process and the case for dynamic change space
Space does not have a static importance, but emerges as important in a process where 
different stages have different space requirements. The process idea dates back to 
Lewin’s (1947) three stage model emphasizing first unfreezing the inertial equilibrium 
then moving to a new way of doing things and ultimately freezing the change in a new 
equilibrium. We build on Lewin’s model, our previous work (Andrews 2008), and that of 
others
xxv to suggest a five stage process in Figure 3 (given more detail in Annex 1) where: 
 Pre-conceptualization involves establishing readiness and acceptance for change
 Conceptualization involves establishing a change vision and plan
 Initiation sees change agents instigating change through early adoption mechanisms
 Transition involves the spread of change as it starts to replace old ideas and processes
 Institutionalization is where change becomes widespread de facto reality.8
Figure 3. Simplified stages of psychological and learning journeys for change targets
Change stages  Pre-conceptualization Conceptualization Initiation Transition Institutionalization
Psychological 
issues 
(and strategic 
responses)
Skepticism/Cynicism/Denial/Resistance
(Anticipation/Confirmation)
Exploration
(Culmination)
Commitment 
(Aftermath)
Learning 
dimensions 
Unlearning and frame braking Cognitive re-definition Personal and relational 
refreezing
Source: Adapted from Andrews (2008b, 101) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999).
Figure 3 also incorporates ideas of change journeys from social psychology and 
organizational learning literatures. These journeys are increasingly emphasized in the 
literature on change,
xxvi with Judge et al. (1999, 107) arguing that change success may lie 
“within the psychological predispositions of individuals experiencing the change.”  In 
their summary of the human side of change, Ellrod and Tippett (2002) find many articles 
employing a sequential process of learning and emotional engagement akin to Lewin’s 
three stage model.
xxvii Figure 3 draws on these articles to show that change targets move 
from skepticism to commitment by passing through specific stages in which they exhibit 
strategic behavioral responses (like anticipation, confirmation, culmination and aftermath 
(Isabella 1990, described in Annex 1)). This psychological journey is facilitated by a 
similar learning process that involves initial frame breaking, cognitive re-definition and 
personal and relational refreezing. Change targets need to be provided “psychological 
safety” in this process and encouraged to question both their organizational strategies and 
underling norms and values (as in double-loop learning by Chris Argyris (1990)).
An effective, change facilitating journey is characterized by learning induced trust, 
empowerment of change targets and acceptance of the change experience by these 
targets. We note that this journey requires specific space, where enough people believe
learning matters and are committed to the journey, they are authorized (and given safety) 
to learn, and enabled in the process. Heifetz, Linsky and Grashow’s (2009, 155) “holding 
environment” conceptualizes such space, which provides “safety and structure for people 
to surface and discuss the particular values, perspectives, and creative ideas they have on 
the challenging situation they all face.” This space, the authors argue, is vital for “doing 
adaptive work in organizations.”
Figure 3 seems to suggest that the change process is linear but we agree with most 
theorists and practitioners that this is seldom the case.
xxviii We copy Buchanan, et al. 
(2005, 199) in citing Pettigrew’s belief that change is an “untidy cocktail” that is neither 
“static [n]or neatly time bound” and believe that change involves complex iterative steps, 
feedback loops, and so forth that differ between contexts (and thus defy standard 
graphical representation in Figure 3). Acknowledging such complexity does not 
undermine the value in thinking about change processes, however. 
xxix Empirical studies 
like Zand and Sorrenson (1975) and Ford and Greer (2006) find some support for the idea 
that change only reaches institutionalization successfully if it passes (at some point and in 9
some sequence) through specific stages. Kotter (1995, 66) warns that bypassing certain 
stages is a “key error” (especially when “declaring victory too soon” or progressing to 
implementation before ensuring a need to change).
xxx
We think that it is useful to be aware of the different stages presented above, because we 
believe that the change space required in different stages is different. In early change 
stages the major challenge may be to facilitate contextual acceptance while in later stages 
it might be to introduce new abilities or formal and informal authorization mechanisms to 
institutionalize the change, for example. (Different challenges are described further in 
Andrews, 2008b). We believe that the different challenges of different stages are 
important building blocks of change (even if there are questions about which stage goes 
first) and imply different challenges and the need for different strategies as change 
progresses. We believe it is useful to ask, especially in the development context, whether: 
Enough time is spent on creating readiness for change in pre-conceptualization?; The
psychological journey gets any attention in technical reform?; Attempts are made to 
foster the learning journeys that theory suggests are vital to getting people to move?
Content, the possibilities of problems, and contingency of change space
Literature reminds us to remember content when we consider the space needed to effect 
change and the contextual and process demands of change. Space and process (how to do 
change) are ultimately contingent in some respect on content (what the change is).
Content refers to the change being implemented and is peculiar to the specific change 
event. Differences in content accommodate different types and degrees of change and 
require different change strategies. Many authors emphasize the importance of problems 
as the basis of content, for example, and argue that the failure to frame change as the 
result of and response to an emerging problem significantly limits the potential to effect 
change.
xxxi A problem (or even better a crisis) forms the basis of ensuring a need for 
change and framing a vision that is appealing to change targets (vital in obtaining 
acceptance for change). 
Problems come in different forms, which have captured the attention of various authors. 
Contingency theorists note that some problems emerge from profound uncertainty and 
have no known solutions, for example, while others are better understood and the set of 
solutions is more apparent. These different problems demand different types of change 
space. Countries trying to identify new industries to drive growth require large, 
experimental change space while countries trying to better regulate an existing industry 
require more structured and specified space, for example. 
Burke and Litwin (1982) identified other differences in problem types, calling some 
transformational and others transactional. Transformational problems require change to 
the core values and behaviors of organizations and individuals, whereas transactional 
problems involve adjusting the structural parameters that determine an organization’s 
incentives, motivation and control infrastructure. Transformational problems require 
adjustments to core factors like mission, culture and strategy while transactional 
problems entail a different content altogether (management practices, structures, policies 
and procedures).
xxxii  Heifetz (1994) and Linsky and Heifetz (2002) refer to similar 
content differences when they differentiate between adaptive and technical problems. 
Technical problems can be addressed by a technician or expert who fine tunes existing 10
ways of getting things done, while adaptive problems require deeper transformation by 
more people in the community who have to change their values, behavior, or attitudes;
often learning new ways of doing new business. Linsky and Heifetz (2002) argue that 
many change initiatives fail because adaptive problems are misdiagnosed (and/or 
mistreated) as technical problems—with incorrect change space provided and often 
poorly fitted processes followed. 
The argument is relevant, we believe, for the development community; where problems 
are generally adaptive and solutions are commonly technical. Change is limited because 
adaptive problems are different to technical problems—requiring different change space 
and different change process.  
Leadership and change: Theory and propositions
This discussion showcases the complexity of change and raises a question: Who ensures 
that change context, process and content relate effectively and that change space is 
engineered to ensure readiness for change and adjustment in the change process? While 
some disagree,
xxxiii most theorists would answer, “That is the role of leadership!”
xxxiv
Many leadership scholars connect leadership to change as well, including Burns (1978) 
who argues that leadership manifests most in the change context, and Linsky and Heifetz 
(2002) who introduce leadership as facilitating adaptive change. Yukl (2002, 273) argues 
that, “[Change] is the essence of leadership and everything else is secondary.”  
The leadership literature comprises a fragmented set of perspectives balkanized into 
“various clusters of theories and approaches” (Fernandez 2004, 200). Theorists relate 
steadfastly to schools of thought that seem exclusive and difficult to integrate, sporting 
names like “trait theory”, the “leadership behavior” school, “power and influence 
approach”, “situational and contingency theory”, “transactional and transformational 
leadership”, “collaborative leadership”, “connective leadership” and “followership”. 
These schools tend to posit different arguments in regard to fundamental questions, like: 
Who is the change leader? Why? What does the leader do in the change process? How? 
How does context influence leadership in change? 
We believe these are vital questions to better understand how leadership makes a 
difference in the change process. They are also important for those parties attempting to 
craft interventions that stimulate leadership-led change solutions. We address them below 
and raise research propositions based on our attempt at an inclusive reading of the 
literature, and the change space perspective already discussed.  
Who is the leader, and why?
Modern leadership literature arguably has its deepest roots in writings about individual 
leaders and the nineteenth century’s great man theory.  This approach is said to underlie 
trait theory which suggests that peculiarly talented individuals (mostly men) are called 
‘leaders’ because of a set of personal characteristics that sets them apart from others. 
Carlyle’s work (1841) identifies specific talents, skills and physical characteristics of men 
who rose to power, and a variety of studies have followed suit.
xxxv Commonly touted 
traits see leaders as honest, forward-looking, competent, inspiring and intelligent. Many 
other traits are identified across studies, however, undermining the theory’s consistency, 11
and numerous studies attempting to link traits and change effectiveness have produced 
weak results, calling the theory further into question (Bass 1990). Negative experiences 
with ‘Big Men’ in development have also weakened the theory’s attractiveness.
Weber’s (1948) charismatic leader reflects a version of trait theory
xxxvi but is only one of 
three leadership profiles he identified. Two other types reference legal and social 
authority structures as influences on who leads and why. The rational-legal leader is an 
individual who has been given the power to issue commands and exercise authority by 
virtue of legal rules and often because of his (again a male bias) superior knowledge. 
These leaders face strict, systematic discipline under the law and typically lead within a 
hierarchy and given a specific position. The traditional leader enjoys authority passed 
down by tradition (in the case of royalty for example), relationship or favoritism (in the 
case of politics). These leaders often exercise arbitrary power and are disciplined only by 
traditions and relational or power structures that might control their power. 
There are other theorists who argue that traits and/or authority are not what define leaders 
from others. Some, like Linsky and Heifetz (2002) are reluctant to speak of leaders at all, 
and couch leadership in terms of actions (by anyone) that help a set of people overcome 
adaptive challenges. They argue that people in authority and with attractive traits often do 
not use their authority or supposed talents to facilitate change (hence not exhibiting 
leadership). Their approach resonates with functional leadership theory, purported by 
authors like Hackman and Walton (1986) and Zaccaro at al. (2001). This approach 
concentrates on how leadership occurs, rather than who does the leading. Different 
scholars cluster leadership functions differently, but common approaches emphasize 
substantive contributions to task (like providing ideas or information), procedural 
contributions that aid groups to address tasks (like facilitating discussion, providing 
appropriate authorizing mechanisms and relational structures) and maintenance 
contributions (that allow relationships to develop and grow through provision of holding 
environments). It is important to note that leadership is most commonly seen as a 
distributed function across social structures (like teams, coalitions and networks) in this 
approach: And people at all levels and in all parts of the structure can participate, 
providing leadership in functional ways at appropriate times of need and opportunity.
We are attracted to this kind of approach, which emphasizes the functional contributions 
leaders bring  to  change  and  not  their  positions  or  traits.  We  believe  it  is  potentially 
inclusive of the other approaches—with talented and authorized individuals capable of 
playing functional roles as well (where their leadership contribution centers on how they 
use their talents and authority). We also believe there is sense to the idea that leadership 
generally involves multiple parties rather than lone individuals. This sense emerges in the 
simple idea that multiple functions are required to effect change through multiple stages, 
requiring multiple parties to provide leadership. Studies suggest this is the case:
 Rimmer et al. (1996, 43) shows, for example, that change in Australian firms is often 
catalyzed by the CEO but also depends on “a more complex and pluralistic process 
involving different stakeholders.” Different leaders play different roles (with the CEO 
providing  vision  and  support,  middle  managers  operationalizing  plans,  external 
consultants providing outside knowledge and union leaders “open[ing] the doors to 
workforce involvement and the development of trust”). 12
 Himelein and Andrews (forthcoming) illustrate (in Figure 4) how the industrial 
promotion agency CINDE engaged with multiple parties to facilitate industrial 
change in Costa Rica, helping the country move from exporting bananas to 
microchips in a relatively short period. The change came largely because of the 
leadership networks that had been building since the 1970s which Himelein and 
Andrews show in a simplified schema along the lines of Pemberton’s (2000) policy 
networks. The central box represents a ‘policy making terrain’ where actors were 
connected from four groupings; political and government, private sector, international 
and issue actors (academia, advocacy, etc.).  Parties in these four groups acted 
together (within the broader environmental context), providing the leadership 
required to advance the country’s economic growth.
Figure 4. A policy network approach to looking at CINDE’s Costa Rican influence
Source: Himelein and Andrews (forthcoming)
Other studies similarly tout a plurality of roles in change processes like the “idea 
champion” who leads and maintains commitment to a change idea (Kanter 1983) and the 
“fixer” who coordinates the behavior of disparate actors to overcome change obstacles 
(Bardach 1977; O’Toole 1989). Figure 5 shows a basic network with some such roles 
identified and a “fixer”, “connector”, or “coordinator” at its center. This role has emerged 
as a vital leadership function in theories ranging from collaborative leadership (Kanter 
1994) to connective leadership (Lipman-Blumen 2000) and leadership in networks 
(Andrews 2008; Balkundi and Kilduff 2006). This role player connects the multiple 
leaders to each other, facilitates coordination amongst them so that their functional roles 
are demanded and supplied and engaged when necessary and in the right combinations. 
We see CINDE playing this role in the Costa Rican example (Figure 4). Acknowledging 
this role in context of a functional approach to leadership in groups, we offer the 
following research propositions:
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 Leadership is more about groups than individuals, given that there are likely to be 
multiple people exercising leadership in any successful change context
 ‘Leaders’ are identified more because of their functional contribution to change than 
their personal traits or authority; the ‘connecting’ function stands out as vital.
Figure 5. A simple, function driven leadership network
While not a formal research proposition, we observe from the literature (and examples 
cited above) that leadership is not always exercised through people alone but also 
involves organizations and other social groupings. Ogbonnia (2007) finds leadership 
exercised through political parties, for example, Rimmer (cited above) notes the 
leadership role played by unions, and the Costa Rican case notes an important role for 
CINDE—a multi-organizational entity. In all cases the focus of leadership is not on who 
but on why, and what their functional contribution is to change.
What do leaders do, and how?
Combining this functionally driven approach to leadership with the change space model 
introduced earlier allows us to suggest a simple answer to the question(s), “What does the 
leader do in the change process?” and “How?” Given our expectation of leader plurality 
we choose to speak of leadership instead of leaders, which we believe involves the set of 
actions that intentionally creates change space and mobilizes people, ideas, meaning and 
resources to achieve a change purpose. We present this idea in Figure 6 which shows 
that leadership actions center particularly on enhancing the acceptance of change (by 
expanding from the smaller to the bigger circle through encouragement of change-
oriented beliefs and commitment) as well as the authority and abilities agents need to 
explore and pursue change in any given context. The ultimate aim is expanded change 
space at the center of the figure and expanded change emerging in this space. Leadership 
actions could expand space at the start of the change process or during any stage leading 
to institutionalization, and are actually required at all stages to effect institutionalization.
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Figure 6. What leadership does in the change process = Creates change space
Source: Based on Andrews (2008b).
We believe this approach to understanding what leadership does (and how it does this) in 
the change process is broadly inclusive of many different theories about the topic. Three 
types of theoretical approaches are particularly useful in organizing our ‘what’ and ‘how’ 
ideas: transformational, transactional and relational leadership models (where the last 
refers to connective, collaborative and network theories in particular).
Transformational leadership (Burns 1978) manifests when leaders motivate people in 
their organizations and societies to aspire towards some higher purpose or better 
condition of the group they relate to. These leaders focus agents on new purposes through 
persuasion and reference to vision, building belief in and commitment to something 
‘better’ (facilitating acceptance) and inspiring confidence, responsibility and even 
capacity to pursue this ‘better’ state (enhancing authority and ability). Bass (1998) argues 
that such leaders may be charismatic but also need to know how to provide “intellectual 
stimulation” and “individualized consideration” to followers.
xxxvii Similarly, Bennis 
(1993, 75-85) identified “four competencies of leadership” as an applied extension of 
‘how’ transformational leadership works. As referenced in Hennessey (1998, 527), these 
include managing attention (introducing or catalyzing a new vision in an organization), 
managing meaning (communicating the vision, including through behavior modeling), 
managing trust (by demonstrating reliability and constancy), and managing self (which 
interestingly involves knowing when and how to delegate and engage others in the 
change process). Hennessey (1998, 527) argues that “each of these four competencies 
directly addresses what the leader does” and finds that public sector reinvention (in the 
US government) is catalyzed when they are present. 
We believe that transformational leadership fosters reinvention because motivational 
actions can expand the space agents have to explore and implement change—being more 
inspired, committed and empowered to adjust. Leadership can also involve actions that 
are less ‘inspirational’ in nature, however. Burns (1978) refers to transactional leadership 
where delegated authority and incentive and control mechanisms are used to ‘lead’ an 
Leadership can build acceptance (by managing 
attention and meaning, framing facts, coaching, etc.) 
Leadership can enhance ability (by fostering new 
productive relationships, accessing new finances, etc.)
Leadership can ensure appropriate authority and 
accountability structures are established (by 
empowering followers, delegating responsibilities, 
buffering the organization from external influences, 
etc.)
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organization in accomplishing a goal—which often involves change albeit motivated by 
the personal interests of agents (rather than their more noble aspirations). Nye (2008, 63) 
says that these leaders “create concrete incentives to influence followers’ efforts and set 
out rules that relate work to rewards.” This type of leadership often involves actors in 
formal positions of authority and political leadership, where we see politics centered on 
the “acquisition, influence and exercise of authority” (Ilchman and Uphoff 1997, xxiii). 
These actors can foster change space by structuring rules, processes and incentives to 
encourage learning, experimentation, and delegated accountability to identify problems 
and pursue change as solution. They are particularly important in organizations and 
societies where institutions encourage behavior that does not contribute to 
development—involving shared growth and progress. 
Some observers view transactional leadership as the poorer version of transformational 
leadership, noting that the latter has a more noble or moral drive. We disagree and argue 
that both sets of leadership activities can have a strong moral basis, facilitating change 
that furthers the production of public value and broadly empowers social agents (Moore 
1991). Transformational leadership can stimulate this type of change but so can 
transactional leadership, especially through the creation of rules and incentives that 
incentivize agents to pursue public value creation, allow open access in societies and 
encourage learning in organizations (North 1995; Senge et al. 1999). Agents will not be 
able to respond to a transformational leader’s inducement to transcend self interest and 
pursue core change if the society is closed and the organizational rules limit learning and 
discovery, for example, or where formal and informal institutions promote the pursuit of 
private rather than public value. Where transactional leaders foster societies that are open 
and focused on public value creation, and where learning is accommodated by 
progressive authorizing mechanisms, we believe agents have space to explore new 
beliefs, pursue good struggles,
xxxviii experiment with latent abilities, and ultimately 
generate change that benefits others (even if there is no transformational leader appealing 
to higher ideals).
Beyond transformational and transactional leadership theory, we think relational 
leadership dimensions are vital to consider when asking what leaders do to create change 
space and how. In earlier discussion we argued that leadership is likely to involve more 
than one party: We believe that the social structures in which these many parties engage 
to get things done are key to understanding leadership in change. Structural examples 
include teams, coalitions and networks that emerge as vehicles through which leadership 
solutions facilitate change. Within these structures, and in different contexts, one finds 
different leadership actions facilitating relational connections and overcoming
engagement problems centered on issues like communication, coordination, conflict and 
feedback. Relationship promotion can directly empower people and create change space. 
In rapid results initiatives, for example, the creation of teams is vital to getting people 
thinking about problems, finding creative solutions they can commonly believe in and 
commit to. Matta and Ashkenas (2003, 5) say that when leadership creates a team and 
assigns it authority to solve a problem and produce a result “the team is free—indeed, 
compelled—to find out what activities will be needed and how those activities will fit 
together.” Obviously this is not always the case with teams and other social and 
participative structures, and the transactional designs of these matter a great deal.    16
In referencing such designs, Archer and Cameron (2008) emphasize leadership roles in 
fostering collaborative relationships, simplifying complex situations for their people, and 
facilitating relationship building in their organization and between their organization and 
others. Linsky and Heifetz (2002) identify key relation-enhancing leadership acts 
including setting conflicts in dialog, creating holding environments for productive dialog 
in organizational and social settings, and delegating responsibilities. Heifetz, Linsky and 
Grashow (2009, 155) describe the holding environment in relational terms, consisting of, 
“All those ties that bind people together and enable them to maintain their 
collective focus on what they are trying to do. All the human sources of 
cohesion that offset the forces of division and dissolution provide a sort of 
containing vessel in which work can be done.” 
Gilley et al. (2008) include coaching and team building as examples of relational 
mechanisms leaders use to create such an environment and ‘implement change and drive 
innovation’. Hudson (1990) also emphasizes coaching as a key leadership ‘how’, arguing 
that coaching empowers social relations, helping groups “to question the status quo, 
approach situations from a new perspective and allow others to make mistakes and learn 
from them.” Through such actions leadership empowers the social engagement of agents 
and ‘unleashes change’ (Kelman 2005) as the social structures become venues for 
building acceptance (common beliefs and dependence-based commitment), expanding 
group-based authority (with accountability) and connecting often-dispersed abilities.   
Speaking of transformational, transactional and relational dimensions of leadership 
interventions requires us to mention the role of problems (again). We are struck by the 
regularity with which literature on leadership mentions the opportunities problems and 
crisis create for leadership. Problems are seen as vital to informing a change message (in 
a transformational sense), directing the way institutions and structures should be shaped 
to allow learning and pursuit of change (transactional actions), and creating a sense of 
urgency as the glue around which coalitions develop (relational actions), for example. 
Given the importance of problems, we believe that leadership action should center on 
unearthing and addressing problems. Schein (1996, 65) puts it nicely when he identifies 
problems as the starting point of any change—and we extend to leadership—engagement: 
“Only when one has genuinely understood the problem and what kind of help is needed, 
can one even begin...” Given this discussion, we offer the following research proposition 
about ‘what’ leaders do to facilitate change and ‘how’:
 Leadership contributes to change when it builds change space—where leaders foster 
acceptance for change, grant authority to change (with accountability), and introduce 
or free the abilities necessary to achieve change. Change space is especially enhanced 
where leadership facilitates open access societies and learning organizations in which 
members are empowered—in groups— to pursue change through problem solving.
We believe that an interesting extension of this proposition involves thinking of the 
interactive relationship between leadership and change space. Our core proposal sees 
leadership fostering change space but we also believe that change space creates 
opportunities for leadership, especially when the change space unearths problems and 
facilitates solutions to these problems (as in Figure 7). 17
Figure 7. Is there a dynamic interaction between leadership and change space?
While beyond the scope of this paper, we wonder whether development in societies and 
organizations is a function of the persistence and regularity of such interaction? Are more 
developed nations characterized by situations where leadership creates change space and 
change through problem solving, which fosters new expressions of leadership in broader 
groups, which then facilitates more change space? Is this interactive dynamic the reason 
why some organizations and societies develop better abilities to identify and deal with 
problems, continuously and episodically, and improve their capacities? Are less 
developed countries and stagnant organizations characterized by limited leadership 
engagement fostering limited space and not then feeding dynamically into expanded 
forms of leadership and space?
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Context and leadership
We offer this and other propositions as particular ideas about what leadership that 
facilitates change looks like. We call this leadership-led change. Some may argue that the 
propositions are not suited to all contexts and are particularly unsuited to the context in 
which development occurs—involving hierarchical public organizations in developing 
countries. We disagree with this sentiment and believe that the propositions above hold 
for all contexts as core principles that hold even if the expression of leadership 
engagements probably differs somewhat. We thus offer a final proposition:
 Leadership manifests in different ways in different contexts, depending on contextual 
readiness and factors that shape change and leadership opportunities; but the key 
characteristics of plurality, functionality, problem orientation and change space 
creation are likely to be common to all successful leadership-led change events.
We do not deny that context influences leadership. Cross cultural work shows that culture 
influences the way people answer basic questions about leadership, for example, 
including “who” and “why”:
xl Some cultures apparently see ‘cunning’ as an important 
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leadership trait while others see it as a major problem for leaders; High power-distance 
societies are expected to foster authority-based leadership relationships more than others; 
Collectivist cultures are seen to value and foster inclusive  leadership models more than 
individualistic cultures do. Studies also suggest different leadership models prevail in 
different organizational types with hierarchies characterized by authority-based 
leadership and flatter organizations espousing team-based leadership mechanisms.
Such studies commonly describe leadership structures in developing countries as 
patrimonial,
xli characterized by a directive leadership style that emphasizes status 
(authority) and social engagement.  They ascribe this style to the (apparently) higher 
power distance tendencies in these societies, strong family bonds, a sense of fatalism, and 
the expectation that organizations like the government will take care of people. Surely 
people will identify leaders of change because of their position in such settings rather 
than their functional contribution? Surely people will look to individual leaders to make a 
difference instead of groups? We could raise similar questions about public 
bureaucracies, given theories that different leadership styles work differently (are 
contingent upon) different contexts.
xlii Weber developed an entire leadership profile to 
match bureaucratic structures and authors over the years have described ‘leadership’ in 
bureaucracies using terms like ‘conservator’.
xliii Surely government bureaucracies are 
unlikely to exhibit leadership by non-authorized people in horizontal teams, involving 
acts of double-loop learning and deep organizational analysis? Surely change can be 
achieved in these settings through the strong leadership of an individual at the top of the 
organizational hierarchy, given the authority and influence he (probably) has?
We do not believe so, and suggest that models people commonly allude to as evidence of 
individual leader-led change in such settings miss out on the larger reality that change-
inducing leadership is always group based, involving multiple parties (and functions) and 
successful because of the change space it creates. Presidents Park of Korea and Lee Kuan 
Yew of Singapore certainly opened opportunities for modernization in their countries, but 
the leadership that took these countries towards developed status involved many people, 
organizations and groups over many years and not just the top leaders. Nelson Mandela is 
the model of an individual transformational leader, but research suggests his influence 
was strongly augmented by the social structures in the African National Congress and 
beyond.
xliv Such observations are commonplace in the work of Adrian Leftwich’s 
Leaders, Elites and Coalitions team, which argues that “Successful and sustained 
development depends crucially on whether, why and how various leaders and elites 
across the public and private domains are able to form sufficiently inclusive 
‘developmental coalitions’ (or growth coalitions), formal or informal.”
Given this line of argument, we hold that leadership only enhances change space (hence 
facilitating change) when it is expressed through groups and where the members of these 
groups engage in coordinated, functionally appropriate ways (See Andrews 2008b). 
These group-based solutions will look different in different contexts—perhaps being 
more structured across bureaucracies than in flatter organizations for example—but they 
are vital to the idea of leadership-led change. We also believe leadership-led change 
experiences will be contextual—meaning there will be antecedent events that ready the 
context for such leadership and factors that shape it. These could include gradual 
developments along a steady path (like the promotion of a civil society that might create 19
growing demand for leadership that allows open access) or it might involve conjunctive 
events that destabilize a path (a shock that brings key players together in coalitions of 
necessity, for example). Where the context is not ready for this kind of change-inducing 
leadership and societies are locked into models that do not accommodate such leadership, 
we believe change will be limited (either for all or to a small group, commonly elites) and 
development will be undermined. Limited change space in these contexts will have 
similar effects as low fitness does for biological organisms facing evolutionary 
adjustment: they stagnate and ultimately fall behind those who are fitter. This, we 
believe, is a large part of the story about development failure (suggested in Figure 2).
Examining our propositions: A Method
We do not intend to raise these propositions for theoretical exploration only. They 
emerge against the backdrop of real, practical engagements focused on stimulating 
development through leadership promotion. In 2007 a multi donor group called the 
Global Leadership Initiative (GLI) put out a call for examples of these kinds of 
interventions and received over 100 responses. 50 cases were written up, documenting 
different approaches to promote leadership-led change already being taken by developing 
country governments themselves, multi- and bi-laterals and non-profits and private 
organizations. These include rapid results interventions, visioning strategies, negotiations 
space initiatives, group-based planning exercises and many others. 
In 2008 The GLI began asking questions about whether these interventions were 
fostering solutions to problems and how these solutions worked. The intention of these 
questions was not to conduct evaluations but rather to learn lessons and begin 
understanding how change really happens in the development process and what role 
leadership can play in such: And whether anything can be gained from interventions that 
mean to spark leadership-led change approaches. Our theoretical discussion frames 
propositions for researching these questions and the current section presents a research 
method behind just such an empirical study, results of which are presented later. 
Research approach and data sources 
Our research propositions attempted to shed light on how change works and how 
leadership can catalyze change. A common research strategy adopted for such work, 
employed in studies like Hennessey (1998) and Rimmer et al. (1996), involves 
identifying a set of organizations undergoing change and using qualitative data collection 
mechanisms and content analysis of this data to investigate how change occurs and how 
leadership manifests in the change process. Applying such approach, we identified 14 
change engagements in 8 developing countries, listed in Table 1, interviewed people who 
had been involved in these processes, and analyzed the content of these interviews to see 
if our propositions had any empirical support. Our goal was not so much to prove our 
propositions correct, as if these propositions were the final stop on a theoretical journey. 
Rather, we intended to see whether there was evidence to suggest the propositions 
pointed towards valuable insights for theory and practice and to gain information on how 
the propositions might be more substantiated (or more tightly specified).20
Table 1. Cases selected for inclusion in the analysis
Country/Intervention (period) Source of fragility
1. Afghanistan Civil Service Leadership Program for Top Officials (06-08) Post conflict, no capacity
2. Afghanistan: Towards a National Plan (2002) Post conflict, no capacity
3. Burundi Governance, Leadership Capacity Development (07-09) Post conflict, no service 
delivery
4. Central African Republic 2004 Leadership Seminar Post conflict, state building
5. Central African Republic 2005 Leadership Workshop Post conflict, state building
6. Kenya Results Based Management (04–09) Service delivery failures
7. Kenya : Strengthening the Role of the National Assembly (00-09) Weakened executive, 
growing democracy
8. Kosovo: Municipal Anti- Corruption Initiative (04–06) Post conflict, state building
9. Rwanda: Rapid Results (07–09) State building, Service failure
10. Rwanda Imihigo:  Results-Based Services (07-09) New local govts., Services
11. Sierra Leone: Club de Madrid African Women Leaders (2007) Post conflict, women in govt.
12. Sierra Leone: Rapid Results (04-09) Post conflict, new local govts.
13. Uganda: Leadership Preparation for a Government Transition (2006) Transition to multi-party 
govt.
14. Uganda Leadership Forum for Ministers, Permanent Secretaries (2007) Transition to multi-party 
govt.
We chose cases in countries that could be called fragile and where we knew a change 
intervention had occurred. These are extreme cases where development seems frustrated 
by constraints and leadership is often felt by its absence (Collier 2007). Given the high 
case variation (across countries and sources of fragility), we needed as robust a research 
protocol as possible—such that we captured information about similar things across the 
different contexts, to allow comparison. We developed a common questionnaire for this 
purpose, comprising a mixture of open and closed ended questions about the respondents, 
the problem being addressed in the intervention, contextual factors that contributed to the 
problem, the intervention, and results following the intervention. A set of questions 
interspersed throughout the instrument focused on leadership, specifically allowing us to 
talk to the propositions we raised about who and why, what and how leadership matters 
to change and development.
The instrument was pre-tested in telephone-based interviews and slightly adjusted as a 
result; all other interviews were conducted face-to-face in the countries themselves. Four 
primary interviewers were involved (one in Africa, one in Kosovo and two in 
Afghanistan) and interview data was captured in writing and through voice recording (in 
most cases). Written data was collected into a single spreadsheet and a selection of the 
data (about 30%)
xlv was verified against the recordings. There was no evidence of 
consistent inaccuracy in the written collection process or of bias between the 
interviewees.
xlvi Table 2 shows that the number of interviews was not large, in any 
individual case. This may worry some readers, but similar studies typically use small 
samples from specific change entities or events and emphasize focusing less on ensuring 
a representative sample of interviewees and more on accessing quality data from a 
selected set. Data collected in each interview is extremely thick as a result, and takes 
multiple forms (closed numeric answers and narratives, for example) to help ensure we 
captured detailed and reliable perspectives in the interviews conducted. The aim is not to 21
generalize to the population of potential interviewees and tell the full story of each case 
but to observe patterns across the cases that allow inference from the data to theory, 
which we believe the approach allows. 
Table 2. Interviewee data and concerns about bias
Country/Intervention Interviewees % Male % in 
govt.
Overall 148 77% 74%
1. Afghanistan Civil Service Leadership (06-08) 22 91% 73%
2. Afghanistan: Towards a National Plan (2002) 13 92% 69%
3. Burundi (07-09) NA NA NA
4. Central African Republic (04-05) 7 86% 72%
5. Kenya Results Based Management (04–09) 17 65% 94%
6. Kenya : National Assembly (00-09) 7 43% 0.00%*
7. Kosovo: Municipal Anti- Corruption (04–06) 16 88% 88%
8. Rwanda: Rapid Results (07–09) 15 60% 60%**
9. Rwanda Imihigo(07-09) 15 100% 80%
10. Sierra Leone: Club de Madrid (2007) 8 13% 75%
11. Sierra Leone: Rapid Results (04-09) 12 100% 66%
12. Uganda: Leadership Preparation for a Government 
Transition (06-07) 11 64% 100%
* More than half interviewees were in the main contractor working with parliament.
** About a third comprised citizens participating directly in the initiative.
The number of interviews we managed to conduct varied across countries. This reflects 
our sampling approach, logistical problems in some contexts and the nature of the 
interventions themselves, and certainly requires some consideration in discussing results: 
 We took a purposeful approach to sampling by asking GLI partners to identify 
potential interviewees in different categories—especially reflecting what the literature 
calls agents and targets of change.
xlvii We managed to access initial interviews from 
this list and then allowed snowballing to find unidentified interviewees. Both the 
selective identification and snowballing approaches have their weaknesses, but we 
believe they were appropriate for the study at this stage—especially given the novel 
nature of researching leadership-led change in fragile developing countries. 
 We did run into logistical problems in accessing some of the selected interviewees in 
the limited periods of time interviewers were in countries (approximately 5 days for 
each intervention) which is one reason why numbers are lower in the Central African 
Republic, Kenyan Parliamentary, Sierra Leone Club de Madrid and Ugandan cases. It 
proved particularly difficult to access very high level officials in these contexts. We 
have no interviews from Burundi because of such problems, but we were able to 
conduct a participant observation study of an all-cabinet rapid results workshop. This 
formed the basis of our assessment here, which we present as different to the others. 22
 It is also important to note that the smaller interviewee numbers in cited cases also 
reflected the narrower nature of these interventions and sometimes the lag between 
when the intervention occurred and the research.  We found snowballing was 
especially limited in respect of these interventions, partly because we seemed to 
either have most people on our initial lists or because people had moved on since the 
interventions. In the case of the two Central African Republic (CAR) and two 
Ugandan interventions, we found the initial lists overlapped substantially and 
interviewees considered events as part of the same process. We present data together 
in both cases, therefore; the consolidation reduces our number of cases to 12.
Table 2 shows obvious forms of bias in the interviewee sample. 77 percent of the 
interviews were conducted with male respondents and 74 percent of the interviewees 
worked in government in the country in question. We reflect on potential bias in the 
research findings discussed hereafter, but also note that the bias could have been expected 
given that we are focusing on formal development work in developing countries which is 
dominated by government entities and many suggest by men as well (especially in 
patriarchal countries, dominating our set of cases). There is also an implicit suggestion 
that the nature of GLI-identified interventions themselves may have promoted such 
biases. One should note that some interviewee groups do not exhibit these biases, partly 
because of the design and focus of the intervention: Females dominate interviewees in 
respect of the Club de Madrid work in Sierra Leone, for example and almost half of the 
Rwanda Rapid Results interviewee pool comprised women and non-government agents, 
with citizens actually making up a sizeable portion. This distribution certainly seems to 
reflect the fact that the Club de Madrid work had a focus on raising the role of women 
parliamentarians and the Rwanda Rapid Results work focused on local-level 
development.
Ensuring the cases matched our expectations
We thought it important to ensure that the cases chosen for analysis were indeed the 
extreme cases of leadership-led change we assumed in the selection process. The 2007 
case descriptions (and other materials) developed by GLI suggested that the focal cases 
involved situations where, (i) countries were in tenuous positions facing major change 
demands, (ii) change was indeed evident in and hopefully through specific interventions, 
and (iii) the change had been catalyzed by basic approaches to promote leadership (all 
details shown in Table 3). We asked questions in regard to these three assumptions to act 
as controls—allowing us to verify that all cases were at least similar in the three noted 
respects.  
The first control questions asked if the interviewees agreed with a statement we had 
prepared describing the tenuous position faced at the time of the intervention (similar to 
that presented in Table 3 and developed from wording in the GLI case descriptions). We 
intended to see whether interviewees did indeed see the situation as tenuous and fragile 
and whether they had common perspectives on what the fragility entailed. Overall, 80 
percent of the interviewees agreed with our statement directly, or with some minor 
adjustment, clarification or addition.
xlviii While there were some interesting differences in 23
perspective on the nature of the problem (which we discuss later), there was no case 
where a majority of interviewees disagreed that the initial context was fragile. 
Table 3. Basic details about each case and intervention
Country/
Intervention Problem being addressed Basic approach in the 
intervention
Intended influence (change and 
leadership) of the intervention
1. Afghanistan 
Civil Service 
Leadership (06-
08)
The new government was being 
built after 30 years of conflict 
and lacked a top and middle 
layer of civil servants
Training in Germany 
through discussion 
groups on various 
topics
Develop cadre of top and middle 
level leaders/managers in the 
Afghan govt.
2. Afghanistan: 
Towards a 
National Plan 
(2002)
Afghan Govt. lacked any kind 
of vision or focus, around 
which to organize and structure 
National plan creation 
process; Critical 
Stakeholder Enquiry, 
Visioning Process
Establish a National Development 
Framework to guide the Afghan 
govt., and facilitate leadership 
cohesion
3. Burundi (07-
09)
Govt. emerging from peace 
deal still lacked structure and 
particularly struggled to 
provide services
Cabinet retreats, 
Training of trainers, 60 
Rapid Results Pilots
Improve service delivery and 
confidence, accountability, and 
effectiveness of leadership in 
service delivery processes.
4. Central African 
Republic (04-05)
Govt. had emerged from 
conflict but there was limited 
consensus about what it should 
do and limited legitimacy 
2 x 2 Day high level 
consultations, Peer 
Exchange, Rapid 
Results Pilots
Build political consensus around 
governing  priorities especially 
leading up to election; achieve 
quick results to build legitimacy
5. Kenya Results 
Mgmt. (04–09)
Adjustment at end of Moi 
Administration led to increased 
urgency in govt. and pressure 
for service delivery 
Rapid Results Pilots in 
53 ministries tied to 
broader results based 
management reforms
Improve service delivery in key 
areas, mainstream results-based 
mgmt. in govt, develop required 
leadership structures
6. Kenya : 
National 
Assembly (00-09)
Pressures for more accountable 
administration were growing 
and reflected in pressure to 
strengthen Parliament
Workshops, Study tours 
and other interventions
Strengthen leadership role of 
Parliament and accountability of 
govt. as a whole
7. Kosovo: 
Municipal Anti-
Corruption (04–
06)
New municipalities were 
emerging in Kosovo but 
concerns about corruption and 
management control were high
Participatory needs 
assessment, Code of 
Ethics, Consensus 
building, Cooperative 
planning, advocacy
Develop leadership structures in 
municipal inspectorates to ensure 
effective controls on corruption
8. Rwanda: Rapid 
Results (07–09)
Govt. lacked mechanisms for 
governing and delivering 
services in new districts
Rapid Results pilots
Implement integrated local 
development program among hard 
to reach groups by developing 
localized leadership mechanisms
10. Rwanda 
Imihigo:  (07-09)
Govt. lacked mechanisms for 
governing and delivering 
services in new districts
Performance contracts, 
public meetings for 
evaluation and others
Promote localized processes of 
identifying and solving 
development problems
10. Sierra Leone: 
Club de Madrid 
(2007)
Emerging from conflict, Sierra 
Leone committed to increase 
leadership role of women
Peer engagement with 
heads of state, advocacy 
action, mentoring
More women in Parliament and 
govt. and better perceptions about 
women political leaders.
11. Sierra Leone: 
Rapid Results 
(04-09)
Govt. lacked mechanisms for 
governing, delivering services 
in new local government
Rapid Results pilots
Build local capacity, foster service 
delivery and structures for 
delivering services
12. Uganda: 
Leadership 
Preparation for a 
Government 
Transition (06-07)
Uganda would have a multi-
party democracy for first time, 
and govt. structures and 
processes needed to change to 
accommodate this transition
4 day workshop, 
knowledge exchange, 
plan for incoming 
government; Twinning, 
Training, Job 
shadowing; Mentoring
Develop a plan reflecting multi-
party policies, as well as processes 
for policy decision-making, 
communication, implementation 
etc. in new govt. structures; and 
assist govt. leadership to make the 
transition to non-partisan work24
Later control questions asked if the problem had been better addressed since the 
intervention (with intended impacts described briefly in the final column of Table 3), 
whether the intervention contributed to this, and whether leadership had improved since 
the intervention. Again, we were satisfied that results (shown in Table 4) suggested 
evidence of leadership-led adjustment in each case.
Table 4. Evidence of change and leadership ‘impacts’ in these extreme cases
Country/Intervention
The problem has 
been better 
addressed
The 
intervention 
contributed
Leadership 
has 
improved
Overall 89% 90% 77%
1. Afghanistan Civil Service Leadership (06-08) 73% 73% 59%
2. Afghanistan: Towards a National Plan (2002) 69% 65% 54%
3. Burundi (07-09) NA NA NA
4. Central African Republic (04-05) 86% 86% 57%
5. Kenya Results Based Management (04–09) 100% 100% 94%
6. Kenya : National Assembly (00-09) 100% 100% 75%
7. Kosovo: Municipal Anti- Corruption (04–06) 100% 100% 71%
8. Rwanda: Rapid Results (07–09) 87% 87% 93%
9. Rwanda Imihigo(07-09) 100% 100% 100%
10. Sierra Leone: Club de Madrid (2007) 88% 88% 88%
11. Sierra Leone: Rapid Results (04-09) 92% 92% 83%
12. Uganda: Leadership Preparation for a 
Government Transition (06-07) 100% 91% 64%
There is variation in Table 4 data, however. While about 90 percent of interviewees 
overall identified an improved situation to which the intervention contributed, the 
statistics from both Afghan cases in particular suggest lower levels of enthusiasm. 
Interviewees in Afghanistan seemed more reluctant to say that the problem had been 
better addressed and the interventions had contributed to improvements. More than a 
quarter of interviewees in these groups resisted answering “yes” to these questions, 
suggesting that change may have been (subjectively) less forthcoming than in other cases. 
We asked interviewees to describe their binary yes or no answers in more detail, so as to 
strengthen reliability of the data and allow us to better understand answers. Negative 
respondents in the Afghan cases noted (amongst other comments): “I don’t see 
improvement”; “These [capacity constraints] are not priorities”; “Were we better able to 
do our jobs? I could not see”. These were countered by more positive statements by a 
larger portion of the interviewees, in comments like: “We had deputy ministers who were 
not helping each other although their work required cooperation between the ministries. 
Now they pick up a phone and call each other and things get done very quickly”; “After 
the deputy minister came back… he started making a daily list, every day he makes sure 
the list gets done. He follows up and makes sure that the tasks are completed. He has 
more contact with his staff as well”; “Yes, the staff is now using computers and new 
technology. Also, before, the staff was not able to speak and write English and use the 
internet, but now they can.” 25
Table 5 shows abbreviated versions of the positive and less enthusiastic comments 
emerging from interviews in the Afghan Civil Service case. The positive comments 
outweigh the less enthusiastic comments even in this case. There were more of the latter 
less enthusiastic comments in this than any other case.  
Table 5. Descriptions of change ‘impact’ in the Afghan Civil Service case
Comments interviewees offered when asked, “Has the problem been better addressed?”
Positive comments
 Those who were trained, they have been better in their performance in several areas. 
 We had deputy ministers completely opposed to reform, the idea of reform. After they attended the 
program, they became very strong supporters of reform. 
 In some institutions decision making, delegation, communication and supervision have improved…the 
implementation of public administrative reform had been in a better shape [in these] than in other 
institutions and other ministries.
 You can see a lot of changes in terms of better understanding strategic planning, planning day-to-day 
work, how to manage work, merit-based recruitment…Most ministries [now] have the reform program 
of the Civil Service Commission.
 Through all these initiatives and programs, you can see a new generation of leaders in some of the 
ministries. They learned by doing, participating in the exposures. 
 After the deputy minister came back… he started making a daily list, every day he makes sure the list 
gets done. He follows up, makes sure tasks are completed. He has more contact with his staff as well.
 Yes, the staff is now using computers and new technology. Also, before, the staff was not able to speak 
and write English and use the internet, but now they can.
 Participants made the best use of that training. They are proving it. I see them, I look at them. I see 
changes here happening.
 When the deputy minister came back the performance of the Ministry improved.
 Improvements have happened, and we are seeing it. 
 We achieved a great deal, removed most major obstacles from earlier.
 Before I went to the training, I could not explain ‘leader,’ or what is my responsibility here. I learned 
about this, and now I’m good.
Less enthusiastic comments
 No. There’s not much focus on this now.
 The training is still needed in all the ministries. 
 It was too little. It’s a small group of people who have done it.
 A lot of the deputy ministers said they needed follow-up training. 
 Of course we had a few that at the end of the program; we thought it was a waste of money. 
 Still, the major issue remains: instability and insecurity. As long as we have instability in the country, 
the process of reform will face some bumps on the road. 
 Were they better able to do their jobs? I could not see. I don’t see improvement.
 No.  The patient was misdiagnosed. They thought, you know, you send them to a conference in 
Germany, that Max Planck came, or some institute came, the British Council came and somebody else 
came, and conferences. That’s not going to fix this. Because the real deliverables of the Afghan 
government were never defined. If you don’t know where you’re going, you will never get there.
Narrative data like that in Table 5 lends support to the binary answers captured in Table 
4. When considered together for each case, we found that the data suggested that there 
was positive change in even the most disputed cases (the Afghan civil service 
intervention, as shown in Table 5). The variation in the amount of change is interesting to 
note, however, and allows some thinking on how far change may have progressed in 
different cases and whether different interventions may have occurred at different stages 
in the change process and fostered different types of progress (see Figure 3 and Annex 1):26
 Comments about Afghanistan’s Civil Service Leadership Program, for example, 
reflect that early diagnosis of the problem was not complete and the initiation of the 
Program may in fact have shown this to be the case. One commentator suggested, 
“You know, if as a doctor, you misdiagnose, and prescribe the wrong treatment, your 
patient isn’t going to survive, isn’t going to get better. That is the case of the Afghan 
civil service.  The patient was misdiagnosed.”  Perhaps the change process in 
Afghanistan should double back from initiation to pre-conceptualization to ensure 
lessons from the intervention are captured and translated into better diagnoses? 
 In the participant observation of Burundi’s rapid results initiative we saw an 
intervention in the initiation stages, where government has pursued pilots to 
investigate whether the rapid results method is appropriate for broader 
implementation. The workshop we attended gave Cabinet an opportunity to vet the 
pilots and determine whether they would expand the intervention and move towards a 
more permanent next step: Perhaps transition towards fuller adoption or backwards to 
a fuller conceptualization of problems better observed in the pilots?
 In Uganda we felt that the intervention supported a change process that was already 
happening (given that elections had already introduced a multiparty system). The 
intervention seems to have facilitated transition where many pre-existing leadership 
structures were slightly improved but not totally re-structured. Interviewees identified 
a variety of initiatives emerging after the intervention to institutionalize changes from 
the intervention. Statements included: “An annual policy retreat is [now] held”; 
“Cabinet forums on policy communication have been developed”; “There is now an 
on-going dialogue around vision, time management, decision-making—and the 
discussions are leading to creating a committee system in cabinet.” 
We did not structure the questionnaire to identify where the intervention occurred in the 
change process or how far change processes have developed in each case, but we do 
believe there is variation. The variation does not, however, undermine evidence of 
change and leadership improvement in all cases within the context of Pettigrew’s “untidy 
cocktail” of the change process. 
Examining leadership-led change propositions: Results and discussion
Given that we found evidence of some change and leadership improvement in all cases, 
we turn to presenting and discussing results pertinent to our research propositions on 
leadership-led change. We organize this to reflect our focal questions: Who is the change 
leader? Why? What does the leader do? How? How does context influence leadership?
Leadership’s ‘who’ and ‘why’
We raised two research propositions about who seems to provide leadership in change 
contexts and why they are identified as doing so. The first proposition suggested that 
leadership is more about groups than individuals, and we would thus expect that multiple 
parties exercise leadership in any successful change event. The second proposition held 
that ‘leaders’ are likely to be identified more because of their functional contribution to 
change than their personal traits or authority; we believed further that the ‘connecting’ 
function would stand out in situations of change (where someone connects the multiple 
parties involved). Table 6 summarizes evidence related to the first of these propositions.27
Table 6. Was there a leader? How many were identified?
Country/Intervention
% Agreeing  
“There was 
a leader”
Number of 
leaders identified 
(preceding
intervention)
Number of
leaders identified 
(following 
intervention)
Overall 87% 103 146
1. Afghanistan Civil Service Leadership (06-08) 86% 7 20
2. Afghanistan: Towards a National Plan (2002) 100% 17 12
3. Burundi (07-09) NA NA NA
4. Central African Republic (04-05) 86% 5 5
5. Kenya Results Based Management (04–09) 76% 22 21
6. Kenya : National Assembly (00-09) 71% 11 10
7. Kosovo: Municipal Anti- Corruption (04–06) 100% 2 10
8. Rwanda: Rapid Results (07–09) 80% 11 18
9. Rwanda Imihigo(07-09) 80% 10 14
10. Sierra Leone: Club de Madrid (2007) 88% 5 6
11. Sierra Leone: Rapid Results (04-09) 100% 7 17
12. Uganda: Leadership Preparation for a 
Government Transition (06-07) 82% 6 13
The multiplicity of leadership
Table 6 first shows that, when interviewees were asked if there was a leader involved in 
the period preceding the intervention, 87 percent said yes. This suggested to us that there 
was indeed a clear identification with the idea of leadership in all contexts. We asked 
interviewees to identify who the leader was in this period, and heard 103 answers (from 
under 150 interviewees). There were at least two answers in each case, and more than ten 
in five of twelve cases. We asked the same question later in the interview (about who was 
leading now, since the problems were better addressed) and were told of 146 different 
parties—with more than ten ‘leaders’ identified in nine of the twelve cases.
Annex 2 provides the full listing of ‘leaders’ in these cases and also shows that one or 
two names were identified with more regularity than others in most cases. However, we 
did not come away with the identification of dominant players in any case but one (in 
Kosovo prior to the intervention, where the Director of Inspectors and the leadership 
promotion entity Partners for Democratic Change were identified). While we expected 
leadership multiplicity the large number of ‘leaders’ identified in the limited set of 
interviews was interesting and somewhat surprising; especially given we were 
interviewing people in apparently patrimonial cultures and (often) hierarchical 
organizations—where one might have expected some bias towards common interviewee 
identification of one or two ceremonial leaders or authority figures. The bias in our 
sample (towards men in government organizations) should have underscored such 
expectation. But, we did not find a majority of male Afghan respondents working in 
government identifying President Karzai as the ‘leader’ (even though the interventions 
we looked at were at the highest level of government) or many interviewees in Rwanda 
pointing to President Kagame as the ‘leader’ (as some suggested would be the case). 28
Figure 8 maps the ‘leaders’ identified in Afghanistan’s Civil Service Program, Kenya’s 
Parliamentary intervention. Rwanda’s Rapid Results Initiative (in the village of Gashaki 
only) and Uganda’s leadership transition intervention in a network form—following 
Pemberton’s (2000) policy networks approach used earlier to present the case of CINDE 
in Costa Rica (Figure 4 and Himelein and Andrews forthcoming). Each node in the 
network diagrams represents an identified ‘leader’ preceding the intervention (at left) and 
following the intervention (to the right) as organized into the four groupings Pemberton 
argues comprise a policy field; politics and government, private sector, international and 
issue actors. Bigger nodes show those leaders who had been identified more often than 
others. We do not show connections between nodes but simply how many ‘leader’ nodes 
there are, their relative prominence given our interviewee responses, and their groupings. 
Figure 8. ‘Who’ the leaders were in various cases, preceding and following
interventions
Fig. 8.a. Afghanistan’s Civil Service Leadership Program
Preceding Following
Fig. 8. b. Kenya’s National Assembly Strengthening process
Preceding Following
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Fig. 8. c. Rwanda’s Rapid Results (in the Gashaki community)
Preceding Following
Fig. 8. d. Uganda’s leadership promotion in transition
Preceding Following
When considering the data in Table 6, Annex 2 and Figure 8 (a to d) we make the 
following basic observations, related to our first proposition:
 Interviewees in every case do identify multiple ‘leaders’.
 Interviewees in most cases identify more leaders following the intervention—when 
change was more apparent—than preceding the intervention.
These observations suggest support for our leading proposition that there are always 
multiple leaders in any context and perhaps suggest we should speak of leaderships
instead of leadership. We draw attention to other interesting observations as well. First, 
leaders are identified in different ‘groupings’ in different cases. ‘Leaders’ in the Afghan 
and Ugandan cases were predominantly identified in the political/government quadrant 
(with some in the international quadrant). This contrasts with the Kenyan and Rwandan 
examples where leaders were also in the Issue and Private Sector/Community quadrants. 
The variation implies a need to embrace differences in who leaders will be in different 
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contexts, something we address later on. We also observe that there is variation in the 
type of entities called ‘leaders’ in every case. There are individuals (the Head of the Civil 
Service Commission in Afghanistan, Betty Maina in Kenya, and President Musuveni in 
Uganda, for example), organizations (the Civil Service Commission itself in Afghanistan, 
Law Society of Kenya and Cabinet in Uganda) and what we term social groups (like 
Civil Society in Kenya). Table 7 summarizes how many ‘leaders’ were identified with 
each group, preceding (in shaded columns) and following the interventions, in each case.
Table 7. ‘Leaders’ as Individuals, Organizations and Social Groups
Country/
Intervention
No. of individuals 
identified
No. of organizations 
identified
No. of social groups 
identified
Preceding
intervention
Following 
intervention
Preceding
intervention
Following 
intervention
Preceding
intervention
Following 
intervention
Overall 35 55 58 85 10 16
1.Afghanistan 
Civil Service 
Leadership
3 3 4 17 0 0
2.Afghanistan: 
National Plan 8 0 9 12 0 0
3. Burundi NA NA NA NA NA NA
4.Cen. African 
Republic  4 2 1 2 0 1
5.Kenya 
Results Mgmt.  1 5 16 9 5 7
6. Kenya:
Nat. Ass.  5 2 5 8 1 0
7. Kosovo: 
Municipal  1 5 1 5 0 0
8. Rwanda: 
Rapid Results 5 9 5 9 1 0
9. Rwanda 
Imihigo 3 5 6 6 1 3
10. Sierra 
Leone: Club 
de Madrid
1 1 4 3 0 2
11. Sierra 
Leone: R. Res 1 6 5 9 1 2
12. Uganda 3 7 2 5 1 1
The surprising finding is that interviewees identified organizations as leaders more often 
than individuals, overall and in the majority of cases. Some readers may feel that we 
should have pressed respondents to clarify whether they were talking about individuals, 
organizations or social entities, especially when we had some identifying an organization 
as the leader and others the head of that organization (as in the Civil Service Commission 
and its Head in Afghanistan). We did not press for clarification but in all cases asked 
interviewees to explain why they answered as they did. Such answers allowed us to check 
that the interviewee did mean what he/she said and we found no problems with answers 
(no examples where an organization was named but an individual described, for 
instance). Interviewees really did identify more organizations as ‘leaders’ than 
individuals, for the periods preceding and following interventions. 
We suggested this as an interesting issue in the earlier theoretical section, building on
prior research in which organizations like political parties and unions have been seen to 
play leadership roles in change processes. Some might interpret this as a form of quasi-31
patrimonial dependence people in developing countries have on formal organizations 
(which might have some validity given many interviewees did work for large 
organizations and some identified organizations to which they had allegiance as 
‘leaders’). In this case we could expect ‘leader’ organizations identified primarily 
because of the authorizing positions they occupy. Others might argue that organizations 
and institutions play real, functional roles in societies that extend beyond the individuals 
that temporarily inhabit them: A Parliament ‘leads’ in making law and setting the tone of 
legislation more than individual legislators do, perhaps. In such cases, ‘leader’ 
organizations would be identified because of their functional contributions. 
The functionality of leadership
To clarify perspectives, we asked interviewees why they identified particular individuals, 
organizations or social groups as ‘leaders’. Table 8 presents answers, organized into three 
broad categories alluded to in the earlier theory section: “Because they showed leadership 
traits”, “Because of their position of authority” and “Because of the function they 
fulfilled.” A “trait” selection rationale was noted whenever interviewees explicitly 
referenced an attribute of the leader or related to key characteristics in comments like “he 
was the driver” or “he was well trusted” or “she was credible”. An “authority” rationale 
was recorded where interviewees related comments like “it was their mandate”, “he had 
the responsibility” or “it was in charge.” A “functional” motivation was listed where 
interviewees commented on substantive contributions the ‘leader’ made to change, 
procedural contributions that aided groups to address change and maintenance 
contributions (facilitating relationships in the process). 
Table 8. “Why” the leaders were identified
Country/
Intervention
Because they showed 
leadership traits
Because of their position 
of authority
Because of the function 
they fulfilled
Preceding
intervention
Following 
intervention
Preceding
intervention
Following 
intervention
Preceding
intervention
Following 
intervention
Overall 14 13 50 49 91 87
1.Afghanistan 
Civil Service 3 0 13 11 16 12
2.Afghanistan: 
National Plan 2 0 4 5 2 4
3. Burundi NA NA NA NA NA NA
4.Cen. African 
Republic  3 1 2 2 5 2
5.Kenya 
Results Mgmt.  0 2 3 5 10 10
6. Kenya:
Nat. Ass.  1 2 1 1 5 5
7. Kosovo: 
Municipal  1 2 7 5 7 9
8. Rwanda: 
Rapid Results 1 3 5 3 13 13
9. Rwanda 
Imihigo 1 2 5 6 9 11
10. Sierra 
Leone: CdM 2 1 0 1 5 6
11. Sierra 
Leone: R. Res 1 0 8 4 10 9
12. Uganda 0 0 2 6 9 632
We found that interviewees often gave more than one reason for identifying their ‘leader’ 
and that a number linked two rationales together. In some cases the leader was seen as 
having a mandate (authority) and using the mandate to actually contribute (playing a 
functional role). In some instances an authorized leader also had important traits (could 
convince people, for example) and played a vital functional role (like building teams). 
Overall, as shown in Table 8 and Figure 9 (below), more interviewees noted the 
functional contribution of the ‘leader’ as a reason for identification in both the period 
preceding the intervention and following it than traits or authority. 
Figure 9. ‘Why’ interviewees identified their leaders
The data shows that traits and authority positions are still important identifiers of leaders, 
but not as important as function. This confirms our proposition that ‘leaders’ would be 
identified more because of their functional contribution to change than their personal 
traits or authority. This was the case for both individuals and organizations where the 
‘leader’ organizations were often seen as the basis of funds, political support, and ideas 
(especially through international organizations). Even though we expected it, however, 
we are again interested in just how significant the result appears, especially given the 
context of the study and bias in the interview sample.  Many would have argued that men 
in mostly hierarchical government organizations in patrimonial developing countries 
would identify with leaders primarily because of their traits and authority positions. But 
in change processes, it appears, leadership function is more important than form.
Centrality of the ‘connecting function’
We expected to see that a ‘connecting function’ would stand out in all the cases, given 
the need to coordinate multiple leaders. This was certainly evident, with at least two 
interviewees in all cases alluding to such role and 44 references overall citing it as a 
reason for calling someone a leader (over 25 percent of the references). Interviewees used 
different language to describe the role (examples shown in Table 9) and mentioned 
different specific ‘connector’ activities like “inviting” people, “reaching out”, 
“facilitating” engagement, “Bringing people together”, and “coordinating.” References 
Reasons Why Interviewees Identified Their 'Leader'
Because of traits
Because of authority position
Because of functional contribution
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also noted characteristics of ‘leaders’ fulfilling this function including “knew all parties”, 
“was trusted”; “collaborated well with internal and external partners” and “connected 
well with all parties”. These commentators echo our past descriptions of such role 
(Andrews 2008b) as involving parties who are 
“Well known, liked, and trusted, and enjoy[ing] high levels of social capital…[can interact] well 
with people…[are] easily found…[can] engage well with people of all types, spanning 
boundaries … open to questions about the status quo…attract people with problems and needs 
… involved in multiple conversations… ha[s] a close group of contacts who in turn ha[ve] 
access to broad networks…bridge[s] boundaries groups set up between themselves… 
Resolutions emerge through the connections [the connector] enables.” 
One interviewee suggested the leader playing this role generally “took [a] back seat” and 
another mentioned that the connections empowered others to make decisions [rather than 
empowering the connector itself]. This also resonates with our prior observations 
(Andrews 2008b), “That the connector is often not the “formal face of the reform” and 
may not even be a primary beneficiary. This person may not even be the one who 
identified the reform need, conceptualized the idea, or provided the resources—but is the 
one who brings all those people together. “
Table 9. Interviewees in all cases referred to a ‘connector function’ as vital
Country/
Intervention Comments about a ‘leader’ fulfilling the ‘connector’ function
1. Afghanistan Civil 
Service Leadership (06-08)
“Knew all parties and was talking with other parties”; “Got everyone 
together”; “Invited people, shared it”;  “Reached out to the most important 
stakeholders who reached out to others”
2. Afghanistan: Towards a 
National Plan (2002) “Facilitated discussion”; “Bought people together”
3. Burundi (07-09) NA
4. Central African Republic 
(04-05)
“Was crucial in securing consensus amongst all involved (he was neutral and 
trusted and everyone came because he was there)”; “Connected all funders 
like no one else could”; “Engaged with the external funders and the internal 
delegations”; “Collaborated well with inside and outside partners”
5. Kenya Results Based 
Management (04–09)
“Identified other partners and brings them all in”; “Plays coordinating role”; 
“Introduced team members to each other so they could solve problems”
6. Kenya : National 
Assembly (00-09)
“Knew a lot of people, engaged with parties then took back seat”; “Led 
constructive engagement between stakeholders”; “Constantly engaging”
7. Kosovo: Municipal Anti-
Corruption (04–06)
“The team built around him because everyone trusted him”; “Collaborated 
well”
8. Rwanda: Rapid Results 
(07–09)
“Ensured the rest of government was on board”; “Convener that brings 
players together” ; “Bought people together”; “Connected people together”; 
“Coordinates well nationally”; “Coordinates well between people”
9. Rwanda Imihigo(07-09) “Bought the partners together”; “Can bring many partners in”; “Brings 
people into the work”; “They get everyone involved”
10. Sierra Leone: Club de 
Madrid (2007)
“They got everyone to come”; “Is very consultative”; “Engages well with all 
the stakeholders”
11. Sierra Leone: Rapid 
Results (04-09)
“Could pull in stakeholders”; “Facilitated discussions between key players”; 
“They coordinate who is involved and which projects go through”
12. Uganda: Leadership 
Preparation (06-07)
“Convinced the president and other parties to be engaged”; “Coordinator”; 
“Communicated with the rest of the public service”34
Leadership’s ‘what’ and ‘how’
We introduced a research proposition about what leaders do in change, and how, in which 
we emphasized the idea that leadership contributes to change when it builds change 
space. This, we proposed, involved leadership actions that foster acceptance for change, 
grant authority to change (with accountability), and introduce or free the abilities 
necessary to achieve change. We proposed that change space is especially enhanced 
where leadership facilitates open access societies and learning organizations in which 
members are empowered—in groups—to pursue change through problem solving.
There are obviously multiple parts to this proposition, but the primary issue centers on 
the idea that leaders create space by expanding Acceptance, Authority (and 
accountability) and Ability, hence enhancing change space. We asked interviewees 
directly whether there was evidence of improvements in these AAA factors (regarding 
change) after the interventions. Figure 10 shows the proportion of interviewees overall 
and from each case who perceived improvements in these factors, and we combine them 
into the change space model introduced earlier, illustrating our belief that change space at 
the center of the Venn diagram was enhanced in each case (given evidence in Table 40.
Figure 10. Proportion of interviewees perceiving improvements to AAA
      Acceptance
Overall 90%
1.Afghanistan Civil Service 77%
2.Afghanistan: National Plan 92%
3. Burundi NA
4.Cen. African Republic 71%
5.Kenya Results Mgmt. 94%
6. Kenya: Nat. Ass. 86%
7. Kosovo: Municipal 81%
8. Rwanda: Rapid Results 100%
9. Rwanda Imihigo 100%
10. Sierra Leone: C d  M 88%
11. Sierra Leone: R. Res 100%
12. Uganda 100%
                    
Auth. Acc.
Overall 80% 80%
1.Afghanistan CS 64% 50%
2.Afghanistan: NP 54% 54%
3. Burundi NA NA
4.CAR 57% 86%
5.Kenya Results 94% 88%
6. Kenya: Nat. Ass. 86% 86%
7. Kosovo: Muni 88% 100%
8. Rwanda: RRI 87% 100%
9. Rwanda Imihigo 100% 100%
10. S-L:CdM 100% 63%
11. S-L: RRI 83% 92%
12. Uganda 73% 73%
Ability
Overall 79%
1.Afghanistan Civil Service 73%
2.Afghanistan: National Plan 62%
3. Burundi NA
4.Cen. African Republic 86%
5.Kenya Results Mgmt. 100%
6. Kenya: Nat. Ass. 100%
7. Kosovo: Municipal 69%
8. Rwanda: Rapid Results 93%
9. Rwanda Imihigo 80%
10. Sierra Leone: CdM 100%
11. Sierra Leone: RRI 58%
12. Uganda 64%
Enhanced 
change space35
The data in Figure 10 provides basic reference points about the impact leadership may 
have had on change space in these cases. Even viewed in such limited form, however, 
one notes some interesting variation. Primarily, we see that more interviewees reflected 
on improved acceptance than improved authority, accountability or ability (overall and in 
the majority of cases). Does this suggest that leadership interventions affect acceptance 
more than authority and ability factors? Or that the interventions were just more focused 
on building acceptance than adjusting authority and ability profiles? Or, perhaps, that 
most cases were at points in the change process where acceptance was the major issue?
These questions are difficult to address, but we tried to dig beneath the basic numbers in 
Figure 10 and access detailed information on what leadership may have done to affect the 
AAA factors. We discuss this evidence, on what and how leadership seems to have done, 
by first focusing on Acceptance, then Authority and Accountability, and last Ability.
What and how leadership impacts on Acceptance
When interviewees noted that acceptance had improved, we asked them to describe what 
they meant. We analyzed the content of these answers in conjunction with interviewee 
comments on why they identified their leaders, to better understand what the acceptance 
improvements were and how leadership might have contributed to such improvements. 
Comments on acceptance were sorted into two categories, depending on whether they 
mentioned changes to beliefs or to commitments (the two aspects of acceptance 
introduced earlier). Where comments mentioned beliefs they were further parsed 
reflecting (i) belief that there was a problem, (ii) belief about what the problem was, (iii) 
belief about a solution, and (iv) belief about implementing said solution. Commentary 
about leadership interventions to improve acceptance were categorized in three ways, 
depending on whether the noted leadership engagement reflected a (i) transformational, 
(ii) transactional, or (iii) relational approach (as discussed earlier).
We found much variation across the sample, illustrated in Table 11. Interviewees in all 
cases mentioned changes in beliefs, for example, but some alluded to more expansive 
change. Reported change was narrow in the Afghan civil service case, the Central 
African Republic case and the Sierra Leone Club de Madrid case. Interviewees in the 
Afghan example only allude to a common belief about there being a problem, and one 
suggests this as a limit: “Constant dialog has promoted common belief that there is a 
problem, but not about what the problem is or how to solve it.” A similar comment from 
the Central African Republic held that, “Workshops create consensus on issues but not on 
the implementation.”
It is interesting to note that these two cases recorded the lowest percentage of respondents 
stating that acceptance had improved (in Figure 10). They are also two of the three cases 
in which acceptance apparently did not go beyond discussing belief to mention 
commitment. Interviewees in eight other cases did mention commitment when discussing 
acceptance, often connecting the change in belief to extra commitment for action and 
implementation. This is particularly the case in the rapid results cases (Kenya, Rwanda 
and Sierra-Leone) where common belief on the problems, solutions and implementation 
modalities seemed to flow seamlessly into commitment to act. Comments noted that the 
commitment was cemented in results agreements, across teams, through collective 
structures and other mechanisms that locked-in the engagement of multiple parties.36
Table 11. How interviewees described improvements in Acceptance
Country/
Intervention
What improvements in 
Acceptance looked like
How leadership appears to have contributed to these 
improvements
In Belief In Commitment Transformational Transactional Relational
1. Afgh. Civil 
Service 
Leadership
Evidence 
only of (i)
No evidence Key drivers initiated 
discussion
Incentives to 
engage, learn, 
introduce ideas, 
hold delegated 
discussion
Workshops, 
constant dialog, 
partnering, outside 
ideas via external 
relationships
2. Afghan.: 
National Plan
Evidence 
of (i), 
some of 
(ii), (iii)
Some evidence 
of commitment 
to plan
Initiated by inspiring 
personality, ideas 
person
Delegated planning 
authority, Plan 
locks in formal 
commitment
Discussion, 
workshops, team 
planning and 
visioning
3. Burundi NA NA NA NA NA
4. Central 
African 
Republic
Evidence 
of (i) and 
some of 
(ii)
No evidence Trusted, neutral 
figure attracted 
parties, embodied 
change message
No evidence Workshops, 
continued meeting 
and discussion
5. Kenya 
Results Based 
Management
Evidence 
of (i), (ii), 
(iii) and 
(iv)
Commitment 
across teams, 
goals, committed  
Inter-Ministerial 
forum
No evidence Results focus, 
delegated teams, 
time pressure, 
Monitoring, 
publication
Cross 
organizational 
teams, Inter-
Ministerial Forums, 
Coaching
6. Kenya : 
National 
Assembly
Evidence 
of (i), (ii), 
(iii) and 
(iv)
Commitment of 
multiple parties 
to each other and 
vision, Clear 
roles
Inspirational figure 
led process, ideas, 
and encouraged 
others
New law initiated; 
Incentive systems 
changed; New law, 
structures led the 
change
Linkages across 
multiple entities, 
Supportive public 
opinion; Committee 
structures
7. Kosovo
Evidence 
of (i), (ii), 
(iii) and 
(iv)
Teams foster 
commitment,  
new mechanisms 
to specify roles
Inspirational 
Inspector credited 
with initiating, 
driving process
Delegation in 
teams, mechanisms 
to shape behavior 
(Code of Ethics)
Team system, Inter-
agency 
communication and 
implementation
8. Rwanda: 
Rapid Results
Evidence 
of (i), (ii), 
(iii) and 
(iv)
Common goal 
and commitment 
to each other 
drives the work ; 
Focus on results
One person identified 
as a driving force
Mayor delegated 
authority, time 
pressure, Incentive 
to think, together; 
results; Collective 
responsibility
Community teams, 
Internal/external 
network 
collaboration, 
Forums, Coaching
9. Rwanda 
Imihigo
Evidence 
of (i), (ii), 
(iii) and 
(iv)
Clear collective 
goals and roles 
ensure 
commitment; 
Focus on results
President seen as 
visionary in 
resurrecting idea and 
inspiring creativity
Incentives for 
delegated problem 
solving, Rewards, 
Goals,  Monitoring, 
Collective structure
Forums, meetings, 
Strategy sessions 
(partner planning); 
Public presentations
10. Sierra 
Leone: Club 
de Madrid
Evidence 
of (i) and 
some (ii)
No evidence One NGO leader 
inspired; won office 
and inspired others
President allowed 
meetings to go 
ahead
Open conventions; 
Working together in 
network
11. Sierra 
Leone: Rapid 
Results
(i), (ii), 
(iii) and 
some (iv)
Commitment in 
groups
No evidence Authority to form 
delegated teams; 
incentives to work 
together, results 
focus, reviews
Ward consultations, 
cross-organizational 
working teams, 
coaching, review 
meetings
12. Uganda: 
Leadership 
Preparation
Evidence 
of (i), (ii), 
(iii),(iv)
Vision and 
consultative 
process locks 
commitment in
No evidence Roles clarified, 
delegated 
authority, vision, 
Consultative 
process formalized
Workshops, 
monthly meetings, 
group planning, 
Committee 
structures
Key: In ‘Improvements in Belief’ section, (i) = common belief that there was a problem, (ii) = common 
belief about what the problem was, (iii) = common belief about a solution, (iv) = common belief about 
implementing said solution.37
We also found variation in the types of leadership mechanisms apparently facilitating 
improved acceptance, although in most cases a mixture of transformational, transactional 
and relational actions was evident. What we previously termed ‘transformational’ 
leadership seems to have played a role in eight of the cases, where high profile 
individuals were identified as inspiring new beliefs, providing new ideas, ‘embodying the 
message’ and encouraging others to think differently. They were central to creating 
acceptance and commitment to vision, even if they did not develop the vision themselves 
(rather inspiring others to work through problems or see reality in a different way, as in 
Kenya’s parliamentary case and the role of political leadership in Rwanda). 
But transformational leadership was more than matched by transactional leadership 
activities (which interviewees in all cases noted more often and with more prominence). 
We placed delegation into this category (even though Bennis calls this ‘managing self’ 
and presents it as a transformational leadership action). This is because we noted that 
leadership facilitates acceptance of change when leadership structures are adjusted 
(temporarily in many cases) to foster incentive structures associated with delegation. This 
could mean creating team structures that cross organizations, reporting mechanisms that 
look flatter than in a typical hierarchy, or introducing participatory planning with a 
performance focus and time limit (effectively creating an urgency situation and the 
incentives associated with such). The structures affect incentives which lead to different 
behaviors, fostering different dialogs, and creating a space in which agents can test 
beliefs and capacities. Other transactional leadership actions involved clarifying roles, 
introducing work plans and vision statements into organizations, forcing groups to 
identify goals and achieve them in allotted time periods, and monitoring achievements 
(especially to build a case for transition and institutionalization of change). We found that 
these transactional tools were central to translating belief to commitment (where 
transactional actions fostered formal and informal mechanisms to ‘lock-in’ acceptance). 
Interestingly, we found the transactional tools often centered on creating incentives and 
opportunities to collaborate and engage around problems, and to lock commitment in 
through these relationships. 
Leadership interventions that fostered relational connection involved other devices as 
well, including developing teams, holding workshops and facilitating discussion and 
conversation, introducing coaches to aid engagements and such. These mechanisms were 
central, we believe, to creating what Heifetz et al. (2009) call the ‘holding environment’ 
in which agents investigate, learn about and progress to solve problems. This is made 
apparent in statements from each case: In the Afghan Civil service case, respondents 
noted, “Dialog has helped build trust in this discussion” and “If you talk about change 
management, it means you’re involving many people, creating a conducive environment,
creating more leaders”; In Afghan’s planning case, “Ongoing consultative groups 
facilitated ongoing discussion”; In the CAR, “Discuss[ions] with others [helped] see the 
needs more clearly”; An interviewee in Kenya’s results case said, “Through interaction 
we better appreciate difficulties resolving problems” ; A comment from Kenya’s 
parliamentary change reads, “The volume of engagement is evidence of acceptance of the 
importance of parliament”; A Kosovo interviewee said, “We now approach problems in a 
team; we understand better, and know our obligations” ; An interview in respect of 
Rwanda’s rapid results initiatives yielded the comment that, “The community agrees on 
problems, understands they can solve them; Acceptance comes through results, and the 38
collaboration of the community in response to challenge”; An interviewee said of 
Rwanda’s Imihigo: “Forums help clarify problems and collective roles in addressing 
them”; Commentary form Sierra Leone’s Club de Madrid case included, “We held open 
convention to discuss things; Space has been gradually opened for discussing this; 
Acceptance comes when you are not doing this in isolation”; In Sierra Leone’s rapid 
results case a respondent noted, “All stakeholders are now involved in a consultative 
process; Acceptance comes through discussion”; Interviewees from Uganda stated that, 
“There have been increased discussions around issue” and “There is a greater 
appreciation for working together.”
We note that at least two respondents in most cases mentioned the importance of these 
relational mechanisms being ‘ongoing’, ‘continued’ or ‘persistent’ instead of once-off. 
We infer that these mechanisms are more influential where they foster and support 
ongoing conversations about change rather than isolated engagements which do not seem 
effective at building acceptance needed to effect change. Ongoing relational mechanisms 
also seem to facilitate acceptance best when they allow expanded access over time. This 
is something we noticed even though our methodology did not allow a proper temporal 
perspective on when acceptance mattered in the change process or how relational 
mechanisms might have facilitated acceptance improvement differently over time. 
Nonetheless, we constructed Figure 11 to try and reflect what we heard about:
(i) Intense, narrow teams and coalitions initially being created to explore problems and 
solutions in early change stages and ensure common belief and commitment in a core,
(ii) Expansion into broader coalitions and small networks to ensure acceptance for initial 
interventions (through experimental interventions commonly involving pilots) and, 
(iii) Broadening even further as change progresses, to dispersed networks where multiple 
small teams and coalitions hold acceptance building conversations at various change 
stages—some focused on identifying problems, others on initiating solutions and 
others getting acceptance on the costs of institutionalization (for example). 
Two acceptance challenges seem to arise as change progresses: more entities need to 
come to shared belief and commitment (about the basis issues like problems and potential 
solutions) and new types of belief and commitment are required with key players. The 
Figure 11. Relational mechanisms and acceptance discussions through the change process
(i) Acceptance in core team    (ii) Acceptance in broader coalition      (iii) Acceptance in network39
former challenge is shown in Figure 11 and described above. The latter involves building 
acceptance about transition and institutionalization, making change permanent on the 
basis of initial experiment. These conversations manifest in transactional leadership 
initiatives—new laws and structures that give permanence to change. We noted that these 
conversations were extremely difficult and often involved leaders in authority positions—
the Cabinet in Burundi, President in Rwanda, and Parliament in Kenya. Conversations 
with these entities seem to be facilitated by early results in change experiments (like rapid 
results engagements), demand pressure (like civil society demands in Kenya), and the 
influence of connectors who can bridge such parties to the guiding coalition.
These connectors are vital to building acceptance because the relational, transactions and 
transformational mechanisms we refer to are typically used by different leaders fulfilling 
different functions in facilitating acceptance improvements. Transformational messages 
fostering acceptance come from a few individuals but transactional leadership solutions 
that incentivize learning and commitment often come through others, for example. 
Coordinating these functions seems a crucial leadership task that we found various 
interviewees alluded to, in commonly identifying leaders who connected people, helped 
spread the ideas, attracted important parties to the change process, etc. This ‘connector’ 
role is thus vital in facilitating acceptance, especially in fostering relational mechanisms.
We also found that problems were referenced repeatedly as entry points for conversation 
about change and for fostering new beliefs and acceptance about change, especially in 
coalitions (which appear to emerge because of common concern about problems). In this 
regard an interviewee in the Ugandan case stated that, “We have to identify problems 
first, so we are much more engaged in the weakness first as an entry point.”Instances of 
limited acceptance—like the Afghan civil service case—seem to have been weaker in 
terms of both the focus on problems and emphasis on relational mechanisms and 
connectors. One commentator, referring to the rush to train Afghans in Germany, noted 
that “If you don’t know where you’re going, you will never get there.” Others bemoaned 
the lack of clear problem identification as a major limit on change and leadership 
promotion: “No one asked if the problem was about using the capacity we already had”; 
“The capacity problem was that managers could not absorb what they were being 
taught”; “The problem was not really training, but building an environment where trained 
people could work—but this was never considered”; “They never really understood the 
problem. In my opinion…it needs research. There could be other reasons [for weak 
capacity]. I was not the designer of this program, so I don’t know [why they chose the 
solution they did].”
What and how leadership impacts on Authority
The change space approach holds that acceptance is necessary but insufficient to effect 
change. Authority and Ability must be aligned with Acceptance to create space for 
adjustment. Figure 10 showed that interviewees perceived improvements in Authority 
and Ability as well as Acceptance, in all cases. But what did the authority improvements 
look like and how did leadership potentially contribute to these improvements? We asked 
these questions explicitly, soliciting stories about how authority had improved and also 
about how such improvements were matched with leadership activities. Answers for each 40
case are summarized in Table 12, which shows how interviewees spoke of ‘authority’ 
improvements and how leadership actions connected to such commentaries. 
Table 12. How interviewees described improvements in Authority/Accountability
Country/
Intervention
What improvements in Authority 
looked like
How leadership appears to have contributed to these 
improvements
Transformational Transactional Relational
1. Afgh. Civil 
Service 
Leadership
Authority still monopolized at top; 
some delegation; High-level people 
vital; Budget certainty; Improved 
confidence, understanding of roles
Deputy Minister 
used authority to 
buffer reform from 
political opponents
Budget certainty 
allowed; some 
delegation; Role 
clarity
Workshops, peer 
learning, sharing 
opportunities for 
deputy ministers
2. Afghan.: 
National Plan
Authority still centralized to benefit 
few, but some confidence; Afghans 
lead process; Some delegation; Plan 
enhances credibility 
Strong mandate 
given from top to 
develop plan, vision
Delegated 
authority to plan, 
Team-like 
structure
Planning 
workshops
3. Burundi Authority to produce services in 
flexible manner was limited to 
pilots; de jure and de facto realities 
are constrained 
New govt. embodies 
message of change 
and service delivery
Delegate 
flexibility, targets, 
time limits; ‘Hold’ 
on rules, roles
Workshops; 
Plan, working 
teams,  
Discussions 
4. Central 
African 
Republic
Still limited authority in Govt. 
because of limits to respect, but 
Committee of Wise Men does lend 
some credibility to process
Committee of Wise 
Men created to 
authorize process
Limited evidence Workshops 
meant to 
galvanize 
support for govt.
5. Kenya 
Results Based 
Management
Performance based 
authority/accountability; But 
limited after pilots; Laws, power 
structures remain; Cross-peer teams 
more authorized; Work plans 
protect from outside interference
President demands 
results
Delegate 
flexibility, targets, 
time limits, 
Ministry created, 
work plan, roles, 
monitoring, Team
Planning and 
working teams,  
Discussion space 
to define 
problems and 
solutions
6. Kenya : 
National 
Assembly
President no longer intimidates 
MP's; Independence; Access to 
resources (people, money); New 
legislation; committee system
Parliamentarian 
pushed Law, 
promoted message 
of new Parliament
New laws, new 
conditions of 
service, control 
over resources
Committee 
system; 
Networked 
collaboration 
7. Kosovo Authority through knowledge, 
experience, team structure, new 
laws, confidence in discussions 
One inspector 
encouraged others to 
do differently
New laws, team 
structure
Team structure, 
discussions
8. Rwanda: 
Rapid Results
Community owns process, 
confidence from responsibility, in 
teams through results,  self respect, 
access to resources 
Delegation message 
from top authorities 
empowered 
community
Teams, results 
targets, work plan, 
monitoring, roles, 
delegation
Team structure, 
discussion, 
connections to 
govt., NGOs
9. Rwanda 
Imihigo
Performance requirements give 
authority to act, ensure 
accountability; public meetings 
mean broad authorization; Results 
expand authority; unity on the goals 
gives us authority.
President inspired 
the process, giving 
authority to Mayors 
and holding them 
accountable
Performance 
requirements, 
public meetings, 
group decisions 
stimulate authority 
and accountability
Community 
meetings help 
build authority 
and 
accountability
10. Sierra
Leone: Club 
de Madrid
Women more in leadership 
positions; More participation; 
Better knowledge, confidence; 
Women working together; 
opportunities to run.
Women won office 
authorized others
Incentives to run 
for office; quotas; 
Incentives and 
opportunities to 
gain knowledge
Public spaces, 
share, advocate; 
workshop, NGO 
connections, 
peer connection
11. Sierra 
Leone: Rapid 
Results
Authority shared with citizens;  
Local accountability via mandate;  
community watch-dog; But unclear 
local power structures; local egos; 
elections bring new people
No evidence Teams, local 
government 
structures, citizen 
mandates, 
monitoring
Local teams, 
forums, work 
commitments in 
local 
governments
12. Uganda: 
Leadership 
Preparation
More authorized; Clearer priorities, 
clearer authority;  Better understand 
of roles, responsibility of each 
level; More confidence
President’s 
involvement gave 
the intervention 
great authority
Clear roles, 
prioritized plans, 
decision processes
Workshops, 
monthly forums, 
decision-making 
structures41
Interviewees painted pictures of authority adjustment that varied across cases. We found, 
for example, that most cases had a mixture of formal and informal authority adjustments 
that facilitated the change process. These included changes to laws and official processes 
and delegated roles (formal) as well as informal delegation of responsibility and the 
creation of informal team mechanisms. Adjustments in authority structures tended to 
create space by enhancing flexibility for agents to identify problems and address these 
problems. In some cases the flexibility was matched by improved reliability of resource 
streams (which agents felt made their de jure authority more real because they actually 
had control over resources). In various cases the flexibility was structured and tied to 
accountability mechanisms like performance agreements or publication commitments. 
The blend of such seems to have enhanced perceptions agents had of their own 
empowerment and role in dealing with problems.
Interviewees in some cases noted that even these changes did not create substantially 
more authority for agents, however, because of the prevalence of pre-existing political 
and power structures that seem to be both hierarchical and informal in contexts like 
Afghanistan, Burundi, and Sierra Leone. We see that these structures were directly 
addressed in contexts where the authority circle seems to have expanded the most, like 
Kenya’s Parliamentary reform. These contexts also seem different in the degree to which 
authority structures have been permanently adjusted, with most discussion focused on 
temporary measures. A number of interviewees in both Afghan cases and all the rapid 
results cases, for example, noted that authority increased during the intervention but 
either reverted to normal afterwards or was left in a limbo (where agents did not know if 
temporary changes to structures would be made permanent). Steps to make new authority 
structures more permanent were seen in Kosovo, Kenya’s Parliamentary case and 
Uganda, involving changes to formal mechanisms (like laws) as well as real adjustments 
in informal structures (political communication channels and invitation lists for policy 
decision-making discussions, for example). Permanent authority adjustments and changes 
to informal power structured seem vital to allowing change progression through transition 
to institutionalization, but also seem more demanding on leadership than temporary 
authorizing activities or those that are more technical.
We found that leadership seemed to impact authority through the three mechanism types 
already discussed; transformational, transactional and relational. The transformational 
interventions were again less referenced, but as with acceptance they seem fundamentally 
important. Top leaders inspired confidence amongst people which enhanced their 
perceived authority to push boundaries. We also heard of cases where influential leaders 
used their positions of authority to buffer and protect interventions from political 
interference. It seems as if such actions give followers confidence and build trust, with 
agents seeing that the leader is willing to put himself out for something he believes in. It 
is apparent that transformational actions and moments can help to galvanize support for a 
change message and draw legitimacy towards a change movement. 
The bulk of leadership functions apparently affecting authority were transactional in 
nature. They involved adjustments to formal and informal structures that shaped 
incentives, reporting lines, relational connections and such in the organizational contexts 
we were looking at. They also involved (invariably) leaders in authority positions, who 
could create teams, introduce performance contracts, allow some flexibility from 42
problematic procurement laws or procedures, increase the authority particular agents had 
over resources, etc. Transactional leaders introduced structures that allowed those under 
their authority to examine problems, explore solutions and experiment with ideas, often 
in relationships that did not exist before. These interventions were extraordinary—
requiring leaders to introduce mechanisms quite different from the norm.
Examples include teams that crossed bureaucratic boundaries in Kenya, and Deputy 
Ministers in Afghanistan who spoke to colleagues in other ministries for (it seems) the 
first time. (We get the impression that bureaucratic leaders in many of these contexts gain 
power by controlling how their people communicate outwardly, so delegating such 
communicating to mid-level teams is a significant adjustment). Being authorized to 
engage with each other opened the doors for these deputies to share knowledge and ideas 
and build confidence. The feeling of confidence translated into empowerment where the 
sharing was tied to real delegation—especially with some kind of accountability backstop 
like a performance agreement. Technical instruments like work plans and agreements that 
clarified roles also seem to have given agents authorizing mechanisms to use as buffers 
against external pressures and to organize internally. We noted that there were some 
instances where people in positions of authority did not create transactional environments 
like this, however, and interviewees noted so: “He should have led because he was 
mandate to—but he did not let go”; “They were in charge and had to allow their staff to 
attend, but chose not to.”
The last comment alludes to the idea of relational engagement once again. We heard a lot 
about relational mechanisms leaders used to build authority. These were often inspired by 
the transformational messages already discussed and were facilitated by transactional 
decisions (with no real examples of people organizing into teams, coalitions or networks 
without some kind of transactional adjustment allowing and encouraging this). These 
engagements involved the creation of teams and forums, holding of workshops, 
facilitation of cross-organizational discussions, etc. A number of interviewees discussed 
how being involved in these entities fostered knowledge gains that improved their 
confidence and feeling of empowerment. We also heard of people feeling more 
confidence simply because they now had access to people who could help them solve 
problems, or how being in a supportive community made them feel more authorized. 
Interviewees also reflected on feeling more accountable to their group members, which 
seems to have promoted public value creation, especially when structures incentivized the 
groups to pursue such (trumping mechanisms that might have previously encouraged 
purely private value creation by individuals). 
It was the interaction of transformational, transactional and relational leadership that 
seems to have been most important, however. In Rwanda’s rapid results case we heard 
how the Gashaki community was inspired to take responsibility of its problems when the 
Mayor delivered an inspirational message that poverty in the village was not something 
the government could solve; a solution would have to come through the community. The 
community’s authority grew through transactional steps that included building teams and 
introducing time-bound performance requirements that forced the community to take 
authority of their situation. Key authority figures in this process included the Executive 
Secretary and locally elected team leaders. Team structures in the community, regular 
forums to discuss results, and connections to NGOs outside of the village were facilitated 43
by coaches and proved valuable in galvanizing perceptions that the community was 
indeed authorized to identify and solve their problems—and ensuring community 
members held each other accountable for doing so. This group-based authority manifest 
in the community replacing an ineffective Executive Secretary and developing new 
proactive channels of engaging with the Mayor of Musanze, two developments one 
would arguably see irregularly in patrimonial systems. Coaches and the Executive 
Secretary played the connector roles in much of this case, helping coordinate between 
parties needing more authority (the community) and those in a position to enhance 
authority (like the Mayor, or NGOs). As in the discussion of acceptance, the connector 
seemed vital in most cases—ensuring that agents not in positions of authority could tie up 
with those in authority positions.
What and how leadership impacts on Ability
It is interesting to note that interviewees mentioned core abilities as key influences on 
both acceptance and authority: Some described acceptance improvements coming 
because of improved abilities, and others noted that confidence grew as abilities grew. 
Table 13 shows comments interviewees made about ability improvements themselves.
Table13. How interviewees described improvements in Ability
Country/
Intervention
What improvements in 
Ability looked like
How leadership appears to have contributed to these 
improvements
Transformational Transactional Relational
1. Afgh. 
Civil Service 
Leadership
More money, infrastructure, 
skills, information. But 
strings, no depth, no 
prioritization.
No evidence Donor processes, 
incentives to create 
and share information
Sharing of information
2. Afghan.: 
Nat.Plan
More money, skills, 
information. But no priorities
No evidence Planning process 
developed
Sharing information
3. Burundi NA NA NA NA
4. CAR More information but other 
abilities limited
No evidence No evidence Participation in 
workshops
5. Kenya 
Results 
More money, skills, 
information
No evidence Results incentives, 
time limit, work plan, 
public rewards
Team structures, cross-
organizational 
engagements
6. Kenya : 
National 
Assembly
Moe money, skills and 
people, information
Idea champion, 
fought for more 
money
Committee structure, 
conditions of service, 
fiscal independence
Network connections 
to civil society, 
committees
7. Kosovo Some say improved finances, 
others not, but better skills 
and information
Lead inspector was 
an idea champion
Laws, Code of ethics, 
Conditions of service 
(overtime rules, etc.)
Inspectors engage in 
forum, learning 
lessons, external ideas
8. Rwanda: 
Rapid 
Results
Locally accessed money, 
skills, information. Slow 
process of accumulation.
Encouragement 
from mayor
Public work program, 
results incentives, 
time limit, workplans
Team learning, 
network, tap skills in 
groups, coach connects
9. Rwanda 
Imihigo
More skills, information. 
Finances still limited. 
President inspired 
creativity; Minister 
was idea champion
Results drive, better 
specialization, 
prioritization.
Shared responsibilities, 
network connections, 
mobilized resources
10. Sierra 
Leone: Club 
de Madrid
Some skills, information 
improvement, and ability to 
communicate. 
External messages; 
Lessons from 
successful women
Training, quotas at 
the local level
Workshops, advocacy 
in communities, peer 
learning
11. Sierra 
Leone: 
Results
Some money, skills, 
information. But still limited 
people, finances.
No evidence Incentives to learn, 
publication required, 
results, time limits
Teams to learn, build 
knowledge, network 
connections
12. Uganda: 
Leadership 
Preparation
Better skills, information Inspiration from 
outside parties who 
show it can work
Access to info. act, 
process streamlined, 
prioritization process
Peer learning, sharing 
in forums, meetings44
Interviewees in all cases mentioned that abilities had been enhanced since the 
intervention we were looking at. In some cases the mix of improved abilities included 
money, people and skills, and information. In other cases interviewees did not feel one or 
more of these abilities was improved. The more interesting variation came in how the 
improvements were described and explained, and how these tied to descriptions of new 
leadership actions. Some interviewees spoke of abilities being enhanced through agents 
having more incentive, freedom and encouragement to explore extant but latent abilities. 
Others spoke of abilities being enhanced through connections made to new parties, 
internal and external to the context, that could augment existing financial, human 
resource and informational abilities. Improvements were not always unequivocal ‘goods’ 
however, especially in the latter set of experiences.
The first type of ability improvement was described in a variety of cases, including all the 
rapid results interventions, Rwanda’s Imihigo and Uganda’s government transition case. 
We heard in these cases that agents across ministries, communities and levels of 
government were encouraged to explore problems and find solutions to problems, within 
existing ability profiles. The message agents were given here was not that they had 
insufficient abilities but that they were not properly focusing their abilities on addressing 
their biggest problems and achieving their most important goals. Leadership seems to 
have created what Heifetz et al. call holding environments in these settings, where parties 
that seldom engaged could engage and learn about the abilities that might emerge through 
creative connections or structured delegation. These environments were facilitated by a 
mix of transformational messages encouraging agents to stretch themselves, transactional 
leadership that created appropriate incentive mechanisms, and relational leadership 
actions that helped foster and energize team, coalition and network building and learning. 
New ability profiles emerged from such environments:
 Villagers in Gashaki learned that they could accomplish a wide variety of tasks when 
working with their neighbors and using creative approaches to solve problems. 
Coaches helped coordinate the different parties to ensure the right mix of abilities was 
present at the right time, sometimes connecting villagers to outside parties (like 
NGOs) who were already in the vicinity but whose capacities had never before been 
accessed (or were underused). 
 Ministry of Education officials in Burundi learned that textbook delivery did not 
necessarily mean acquiring new abilities (vehicular infrastructure, for example) but 
that connections to Parliamentarians and local government officials  led to creative 
solutions using latent abilities (members of parliament and local officials could 
transport textbooks to the localities). Once again, coaches helped to connect parties 
together and ensure lessons were learned that could then be acted upon.
 Kenya’s parliament expanded its role substantially in the last decade, creating 
functional committees to analyze laws, budgets and such. While Parliamentarians do 
undergo training in such work and small support staffs have been established, the key 
to new analytical abilities comes through connections with civil society organizations 
that do this work anyway (Lawyers and Economics Associations, for example). The 
network connections to these organizations were facilitated by a few important 
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We would argue that leadership itself was a latent ability that emerged in these cases, as 
was learning. Agents and organizations with latent abilities found new functional roles 
associated with new functional requirements, and found new ways of learning about their 
problems and capacities to really effect change. Team leaders in Gashaki play roles 
mobilizing community members that they never did before, while local officials in 
Burundi now play delivery roles they did not before, and civil society organizations in 
Kenya have crucial roles to play in providing information to Parliament—a function they 
could always do but which was heretofore under-explored and under-demanded. The 
community, ministry and parliament/civil society groups found ways of learning about 
problems and solutions that ensured a match to their capacity to act—a vital ability.
New functional ‘leaders’ also emerged as outside augmenters of ability, however. This 
included donor organizations, government agencies and projects and sometimes NGOs 
who helped change processes by providing money, technical assistance, and information. 
Ministries of Finance, civil service agencies and procurement organizations were also 
identified as ‘leaders’ that allowed improved access to resources in a way that freed 
agents to explore change. These kinds of entities were often identified as leaders—in a 
functional sense—for doing so. Five interviewees across three cases noted that their 
influence over resources also made them the de-facto key authorizing agents central to 
change. While these roles are obviously very important we were concerned at emerging 
problems with such ‘leadership’ roles because of the turf wars that they seemed to foster 
(in Afghanistan, for example) and the way external parties seem to attach strings to all 
new ability enhancing actions. We heard from at least ten interviewees that while there 
was more money, for example, the list of priorities was so expanded in the process of 
getting this money to undermine its additive effect. 
Externally sourced abilities did not always involve money, however, but also came in the 
form of information sharing in settings like Uganda and Sierra Leone (where Club de 
Madrid brings former heads of state to advocate for and expanded role for women in 
government). Officials from other countries shared experience with in-country peers in 
these cases (and Kenya’s Parliament), helping expand their knowledge and build their 
informational abilities. These engagements had elements of both transformational and 
relational leadership because the outside parties introduced inspirational and encouraging 
messages (as in Sierra Leone) and could also broker new meetings and relationships in 
the countries (in Kenya, for example, and Uganda) on the basis of their messages. In 
Uganda, for example, Canadian officials noted the importance of holding policy 
decisions that involve different levels of officials, which resulted in an expansion of the 
policy-making terrain through new meeting structures that accommodated new players.
Conclusions on leadership’s ‘what’ and ‘how’
The influence of leadership from external peers goes beyond introducing new 
information, however. Interviewees in Sierra-Leone noted how having female heads of 
state from western countries saying “it can be done” enhanced feelings of acceptance and 
authority, “Opening the eyes of women to believe they should be in the mainstream of 
politics” and “helping us assert what we want, why, and how to go about it.” We believe 
that change space is created when Acceptance, Authority and Ability are influenced by 46
leadership, making the connection between these types of comments and the discussions 
on these three factors particularly important.
All three change factors are sometimes influenced by one leadership intervention—as in 
the peer engagement in Sierra Leone noted above. We found that it was more common to 
see different leaders fulfilling different functions related to different factors in the change 
space model, however (and found that even where one act influenced all three it needed 
augmentation from others). The different functions included substantive contributions to 
task (like providing ideas, procedural contributions like facilitating discussion and 
providing incentives) and maintenance contributions (accommodating relational links). 
We found multiple individuals and organizations fulfilled these different functions, 
expanding change space, through varying mixes of transformational, transactional and 
relational leadership mechanisms. Connectors played vital roles coordinating across the 
different functional ‘leaders’ ensuring that acceptance, authority and ability impacts 
reinforced each other and ultimately intersected to create space. Examples include:
 We saw leadership interventions that spurred acceptance for new service delivery 
approaches in all rapid results cases, for example, which were matched with 
transactional and relational leadership engagements that fostered structures and 
connections (giving team’s authority to pursue creative service delivery options and 
the ability to implement such). Coaches helped to coordinate the leadership 
interventions needed to build acceptance, authority and ability.
 Kenya’s parliamentary reform was initiated by leaders who encouraged acceptance of 
a new parliamentary role and simultaneously ensured there was authority to pursue 
such role (on the basis of new laws). Other leaders emerged to give substance to the 
newly accepted and authorized vision by connecting members in parliament to the 
civil society community where abilities could be found. Acceptance was matched 
with authority and ability to create space for change.
Different gaps seem to exist in different cases, however, providing examples where space 
was not created even though some leadership was evident:
 The rapid results cases seemed to build acceptance for a new way of delivering 
services, especially in the delivery teams. But some interviewees noted that 
temporary improvements in authority were not made permanent and this undermined 
continued change: “It has to do with authority and resources and legality aspects, all 
of which are very unclear or conflicted; authority is still very vague and undermines 
ability.” The leadership gap in these cases seems to center on authority demands 
when change moves from early experiments (pilots in initiation) to the point of 
transition and institutionalization beyond such pilots.
 The Afghan civil service case provided an example of leadership interventions that 
were perhaps not well founded on a process of effective acceptance building. The 21 
interviewees suggested about 15 different versions of the capacity problem in 
Afghanistan and many did not think the intervention we were examining addressed 
the core problem. Leadership here introduced new resources, but did not authorize a 
process in which groups could explore problems and build acceptance.
We believe that the discussions above suggest that acts of transformational, transactional 
and relational leadership can indeed build change space by impacting on Acceptance, 
Authority and Ability profiles. We present this basic argument graphically in Figure 12 47
reflecting observations that change was facilitated (through leadership acts) when these 
three factors intersected, and limited where such intersection was limited (as in the 
examples). We hold further that the evidence suggests space is most effectively created 
when leadership acts facilitate openness and learning, often attracting agents to address 
problems in groups. This reflects well on our proposition:
 Leadership contributes to change when it builds change space—where leaders foster 
acceptance for change, grant authority to change (with accountability), and introduce 
or free the abilities necessary to achieve change. Change space is especially enhanced 
where leadership facilitates open access societies and learning organizations in which 
members are empowered—in groups—to pursue change through problem solving.
Figure 12. Leadership creates change space by stimulating A,A,A
Leadership and context
Our research cases covered many contexts, even though they were commonly centered on 
noticeable change events in developing countries emerging from some form of fragility. 
Afghanistan is very different from Kenya, or Kosovo. Central government reform in 
Uganda happens in a different context to community empowerment in Rwanda or local 
government development in Sierra Leone. As discussed earlier, one might have expected 
leadership-led change to look different across these different contexts, reflecting these 
differences. Grindle and Thomas (1997) would say the political economy context should 
foster different leadership solutions, while Lewin (1951) would expect differences 
because of differences in the ‘force field’ of driving and limiting factors.
And we do find differences. Discussing Table 3, we noted that interviewee bias seemed 
to reflect differences in the nature of the interventions we studied.  In Table 4 we showed 
that the perceptions of change and leadership improvement varied across cases, 
seemingly reflecting differences in the problems being addressed, the stage of change 
already achieved, and other contextual factors. Figure 8 illustrated that interviewees 
identified different sets of ‘leaders’ engaged in the change process, in different domains: 
In some cases (like Uganda) the leaders were mostly in the public domain but in others 
(like Kenya’s parliamentary reform) they were in the public and issue domain. 
But the differences are trumped by similarities in what leadership-led change looks like 
in these very different contexts. In all cases we found multiple leaders identified, 
functionality seen as the dominant basis of this identification, and mixes of 
transformational, transactional and relational leadership actions seen to impact change 
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when intersecting to create space—generally for groups to solve problems. We thus 
believe that there is value in our proposition about context and leadership-led change:
 Leadership manifests in different ways in different contexts, depending on contextual 
readiness and factors that shape change and leadership opportunities; but the key 
characteristics of plurality, functionality, problem orientation and change space 
creation are likely to be common to all successful leadership-led change events.
The proposition reflects both an understanding that leadership looks different in different 
places and a firm belief that leadership-led change has some common characteristics: 
Top-down leadership by lone individuals may be prevalent in some contexts but will not 
by itself effect change; “Leadership by edict” will not effect change; Leadership as 
authority alone will not effect change; Leadership as inspiration alone will not effect 
change. Where change emerges from leadership, it involves over time many different 
‘leaders’ fulfilling different functions and building space to solve problems. We believe 
that change is so seldom successful because, at least in part, this type of leadership is 
seldom emphasized and practiced. 
And in the research we identified contextual factors that might promote or limit such 
leadership, especially in development contexts. We learned of these when asking 
interviewees directly about the influence of political and economic conditions on 
leadership before and after the focal interventions. Comments led us to identify what we 
call ‘contextual readiness’ and ‘contextual shaping’ factors that influenced whether 
leadership-led change emerged and what it looked like. We list some of these in Table 
14, labeled as driving or limiting factors (a la Lewin).
   Table 14. Driving and limiting contextual issues affecting readiness and shape
Affecting contextual readiness for 
leadership-led change
Affecting contextual shaping of 
leadership-led change
Driving factors Growth in demand for effective 
government (esp. by civil society); 
Emergent crises; Political prioritization; 
Limitation awareness; Growing coalitions 
of supporters; Shocks that create urgency; 
Facilitating events creating opportunity; 
Common concern over specific problems; 
Appetite for risk and experimentation; 
Neighbor effects
The change domain; Nature of 
intervention; Nature of problem; Results 
demand continued attention; Expanded 
engagement of powerful parties; Evolving 
and favorable prioritization of change 
agenda; Appetite for engagement and 
openness (esp. political); Real-time 
responses to constraints esp. authority and 
ability requirements)
Limiting 
factors
Fragmented agendas (prioritization 
failures); Satisfaction with routine 
solutions instead of problem focus; 
conflicting politics; Excessive top-down 
authority and narrow power structures 
(extremely narrow elites); Incentives to 
pursue private rather than public value in 
governments; limited demand for 
effective governance 
Rush to solutions; Un-prioritized agendas 
that fragment leadership; Excessive top-
down authority and authorization 
structures; Excessive Risk aversion; 
Entrenched interests not engaged in change 
process; Misaligned incentive mechanisms 
(especially promoting private value 
creation over public in the public domain); 
Social and political status quo protection 
mechanisms; Reluctance to learn49
The factors we list will hardly surprise readers, especially those affecting contextual 
readiness. We found these factors emerged as interviewees discussed both the 
evolutionary path towards focal interventions and the episodic shock that seemed to stir 
agents to action. In the case of Kenya’s parliamentary reform, for example, we heard that 
the intervention emerged after a decade of developments in civil society (where the 
appetite for change was provoked and an understanding of a new parliamentary role was 
established). A growing coalition inside and outside parliament grew in this period, 
reflected in the promotion of new laws in the late 1990s. The decade-long move toward 
change was provoked by adjustments in neighbor countries (noticeably Uganda) which 
stimulated and informed the Kenyan coalition. The weakening of the Moi administration 
created opportunities for reform in the late 1990s and the new laws introduced by a group 
of “young turks” provided the shock that made change an urgent priority. The 
parliamentary strengthening work that had been tabled for an entire decade finally found 
its right moment for implementation.
Similar stories emerged across the other cases. The resolution of conflict in Afghanistan 
only made other problems more apparent, including the need to develop state structures. 
It took development partners three years to agree that capacity building was a priority in 
the extremely over-burdened context, however. The need for local inspection bodies to 
have codes of ethics and such emerged a few years into the decentralization process 
where officials started worrying that their solution to corruption (inspection) may not 
have been a solution but a problem. Coalitions had developed around this problem 
realization within the inspection community itself, and the engagement with Partners for 
Democratic Change allowed the opportunity for change. Uganda had just been through an 
election in which opposition parties participated for the first time. A multi-party 
government would be in place and this created urgency to adjust policy-making and other 
bureaucratic structures. 
Some general lessons
From these and other experiences we gleam the general lesson that contexts are not 
always ready for the type of leadership we believe leads change. And factors that do 
facilitate such leadership emerge both consistently along long term paths and episodically 
in the form of change events—shocks or opportunities. 
A similar lesson emerges about how factors that drive and limit change shape the 
leadership-led change itself. Figure 8 showed that leaders fall into different domains in 
different contexts, for example, which we interpret as the result of (inter alia) the domain 
of the problem being addressed. Beyond this, we found that some contexts were more 
flexible than others and accommodated the move from change initiation to transition 
more readily (through development of new laws, for example). In contrast, excessive top-
down controls proved limiting on change in other contexts—like the rapid results stories 
in Sierra Leone mentioned earlier. In Uganda we found that power-sharing agreements in 
the political and bureaucratic domains seem to have driven continued change and allowed 
interventions to mature into more institutionalized, opened policy mechanisms (like 
cabinet committees, policy groupings, etc.). In Afghanistan, Central African Republic 
and Sierra Leone, interviewees noted that established power structures continued to 
thwart change even after the interventions, which affected the ‘shape’ of resulting 
leadership structures and the amount of change space created.50
As with driving and limiting factors affecting contextual readiness, we believe these 
factors influence the costs of exercising leadership that leads change. Where contextual 
factors make it too costly to either initiate change or to ensure it is sustained, leadership 
will be lacking. Where contextual factors make it less costly or allow cost sharing across 
a team, coalition or network, such leadership will be more apparent (Andrews 2008b). In 
all cases, we hold that leadership will manifest to reflect the tensions between driving and 
limiting factors, but that change that fosters development will emerge only from 
leadership that involves many different ‘leaders’ fulfilling different functions and 
building space to solve problems, empower communities and foster public value creation.
Conclusions, and a case for more leadership work in development
We are aware that this paper covers a lot of ground, vast literatures and thick data from 
complex cases. Our core message in the paper is simple, however: We believe 
development is all about change, change requires space, space can be created through 
leadership and the kind of leadership that leads change has peculiar characteristics. 
We have presented our arguments in support of such belief, simplified into propositions:
 Leadership is more about groups than individuals, given that there are likely to be 
multiple people exercising leadership in any successful change event.
 ‘Leaders’ are identified more because of their functional contribution to change than 
their personal traits or authority (and the ‘connecting’ function stands out).
 Leadership contributes to change when it builds change space—where leaders foster 
acceptance for change, grant authority to change (with accountability), and introduce 
or free the abilities necessary to achieve change. Change space is especially enhanced 
where leadership facilitates open access societies and learning organizations in which 
members are empowered—in groups—to pursue change through problem solving.
 Leadership manifests in different ways in different contexts, depending on contextual 
readiness and factors that shape change and leadership opportunities; but the key 
characteristics of plurality, functionality, problem orientation and change space 
creation are likely to be common to all successful leadership-led change events.
We examined a set of interesting cases of change and leadership in fragile countries to 
see if these propositions make basic sense. We believe evidence suggests they do. 
Regardless of the different contexts, and of presumed biases in the sample, we find 
change in all cases, multiplicity of leaders identified because of function not form in all 
cases, and leadership impacts on acceptance, authority and ability seemingly facilitating 
change in all cases.
Our arguments and evidence are presented in the interests of sparking more discussion 
and research on leadership and change in the development process. Our research 
approach can be significantly improved upon to provide more convincing results, address 
more specific questions about leadership, and promote knowledge of this subject even 
further. We hope this paper sparks just such research. In the mean-time, we believe the 
paper endorses the attention groups like the Global Leadership Initiative (GLI) have 
placed on leadership in the development process and the practical work some entities are 
doing in this area. It is apparent that development interventions should focus more on 51
‘how’ change occurs and what role leadership plays in this ‘how’. We recommend that 
the following ideas should drive such shift in focus:
 Leadership is a key to effecting change and promoting development.
 Leadership interventions should focus on building functional groups of leaders—in 
teams, coalitions and networks—around unifying problems.
 Leadership interventions should always be focused on creating change space rather 
than creating leaders as an end.
 Leadership interventions must be fitted to context but consistently emphasize 
leadership plurality, functionality, problem orientation and change space creation.52
Annex 1. Five stages in the change process: A simple model
Figure A2.1 shows a simple process model, which involves 5 stages:
 Pre-conceptualization involves establishing readiness and acceptance for change, by 
destabilizing the status quo, identifying and communicating the need for change, 
creating a sense of urgency to change, and building guiding teams and coalitions 
around this need and urgency.
 Conceptualization integrates ideas about creating acceptance over a change vision and 
planning change, through transforming need to vision (via diagnosis, 
experimentation, scanning, identification with role models, or active participative 
enquiry where change agents and targets work together to think about the future—a 
version of self discovery), communicating the vision, and creating authorizing 
structures that allow the creation of teams and coalitions (and perhaps even broader 
networks) around the vision.
 Initiation sees change agents and targets instigating change through early adoption 
mechanisms like piloting (often through trial and error), empowering experiments by 
change targets (via flexible authorizing mechanisms and targeted resource facilitation 
that establish new abilities), providing quick-wins to enhance acceptance of the vision 
with internal and external stakeholders, facilitating learning and response to 
unexpected outcomes, and expanding teams, coalitions and network connections to 
facilitate expanded reach of the change ideas.
 Transition captures the period where new change ideas, processes and such are 
starting to spread and replace old ideas and processes. There is expanded roll-out and 
reach in the change process, continued empowerment of a larger set of change targets 
to implement change, an emphasis on providing quick wins to enhance acceptance of 
the vision and the costs of implementation (which are usually widespread and 
threatening) and facilitate sustained momentum for change, consolidation of new 
authority structures across broader networks and ongoing learning and response to 
unexpected outcomes.
 Institutionalization is the final stage in the process, where the change becomes the de 
factor reality, through reinforcement of the new ideas, processes, etc. (in formalized 
authorizing mechanisms, organizational narratives and ability profiles, for example), 
measurement of results (particularly against the needs identified as a reason for 
change), and refinement of the change.
Figure A2.1. Simplified psychological and learning journeys for change targets
Change stages  Pre-conceptualization Conceptualization Initiation Transition Institutionalization
Psychological 
issues for 
change targets 
(and strategic 
behaviors)
Skepticism/Cynicism/Denial
/Resistance
Anticipation/Confirmation
Exploration
Culmination
Commitment 
Aftermath
Learning 
dimensions 
Unlearning and frame 
braking Cognitive re-definition Personal and relational 
refreezing
Source: Adapted from Andrews (2008) and Armenakis and Bedeian (1999).53
The simplified figure builds on Isabella (1990) and Jaffe et al. (1994) to show that change 
targets are often initially skeptical and cynical about change, and refuse to believe that it 
is necessary or will be implemented. In order to manage these emotions, individuals 
engage in anticipative and confirmatory behaviors—assembling information about 
change and creating a frame through which to make sense of the proposed change. The 
result is often resistance to change, underscored by fear. Effective learning strategies can, 
however, mitigate this resistance—especially if a strategy of unlearning and frame 
breaking is pursued. This involves producing disconfirming information about the status 
quo, often via problem or inquiry oriented diagnostic interventions, facilitating “survival 
anxiety” (where change targets feel that failure to change will induce personal or group 
failure) and allowing change targets “psychological safety” to overcome learning anxiety
and denial of disconfirming data (Schein 1996).
If targets pass beyond this early stage, they are likely to begin exploring new behaviors to 
test their effectiveness in facilitating personal and organizational success. What Isabella 
(1990) calls culmination results from a comparison of conditions before and after this 
new event, which will cause change targets to amend their frame of reference to either 
include or omit new information.  The literature on organizational learning aptly calls 
such stage “cognitive re-definition” in which new learning is facilitated through “trial and 
error”, scanning the environment, identification with role models, conversational 
processes and continuous inquiry-based diagnosis. Learning is further fostered through 
establishing and managing creative tensions, building shared vision and facilitating 
feedback. As with the first stage, it is important to maintaining “psychological safety” for 
change targets to allow this learning.
Effective “cognitive re-definition” can help change targets to progress to the final stage, 
where they commit to the change after they review and evaluate its consequences (what 
Isabella calls aftermath).  Schein (1996) sees this as the final stage in learning as well, 
where targets test the fit of solutions to the personal and relational context (ensuring that 
it does not contradict or conflict with surviving personalities, power structures and 
norms). The learning at this stage needs to also ensure that change has met its needs, both 
instrumentally and in regard to the cultural, normative and political context in which the 
organization must work.  54
Annex 2. ‘Who’ were identified as leaders (number of references in parentheses)
Country/ Intervention Leaders list preceding intervention Leaders list post intervention
1. Afghanistan Civil 
Service Leadership (06-
08)
Civil Service Commission (8); The UNDP (6); 
The Vice President Responsible (Armin 
Arsala) (3); The World Bank (2); Dr. 
Hamidzada, the effective head of the Civil 
Service Commission (2) ; Head of UNDP 
(Marina Walter); The Afghan Government
Civil Service Commission (8); All Deputy Ministers 
across line ministries (though unequal) (4);  UNDP 
(4); The Independent Directorate of Local 
Governance (2); Civil Service Institute (2); Ministry 
of Finance (3); Ministry of Rural Development; 
Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Urban 
Development;  Ministry of Economy ; Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs, Ministry of Education; Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs; ADB; USAID; World 
Bank; European Community; Japan; Dr. Mushahid, 
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission; The 
President and his close circle of advisers
2. Afghanistan: 
Towards a National 
Plan (2002)
Attorney General (6), World Bank (2), The 
Minister (2), The Deputy Minister (2), 
Ministry of Public Health (2), MRRD, MoF, 
IMF, United Nations, Asian Development 
Bank, Deputy President Arsala, Telecom 
Ministry,  Brahimi of UN, Government, Dr 
Farhang, Dr Abdula, President Karzai
MRRD (3); Government (2); CDC's in Villages; 
MoF; Ministry of Telecoms; World Bank; United 
States Government; Agha Khan Foundation; UN 
Habitat; Sanaee Development Foundation; MoPH
3. Burundi (07-09) NA NA
4. Central African 
Republic (04-05)
The church leader - 'Zikoi' (2); Minister of 
Planning; Prime Minister; World Bank; 
Former President of Burundi who helped 
organize the workshop; Government
Society generally; There are many in different 
departments ; Presidents of local parties ; Rebel 
parties not currently engaged ; Parliament
5. Kenya Results Based 
Management (04–09)
Government as a whole (4); The Public Sector 
Reform Secretariat (2); The head of the public 
service; Cabinet; Civil society; UN; DFID; 
Canada; Swedes; Kenya private sector 
network;media owners association; The 
Ministerial Stakeholders Forum; Institute of 
Personnel Management (in private sector); 
Central Planning Unit; People responsible for 
service delivery across ministries; 
Development partners; Employers in the 
public sector; Workhouse organizations
involved in dealing with the issue; Central 
Organization of Training Institutions; 
Federation of Kenyan Employers; the National 
Industrial Training Body; Public Sector 
Management as a whole
Reform Secretariat (3); Permanent Secretaries in 
relevant ministries (2); People appointed to manage 
teams (2); Kenya Private Sector Alliance (2); 
Political leaders(2); Head of State (2); Public 
servants; Ministers of Departments; Councilors; 
Pensioners (service recipients); Media Owners 
Association; Editor's Guild; Head of Public Service ; 
People in lower cadres of bureaucracy now 
involved; Institute of Personnel Management; 
Teams; Procurement entities; Inspectorates; 
Employers in affected service delivery entities; 
Industry owners receiving services; Civil servants 
generally
6. Kenya : National 
Assembly (00-09)
USAID (2); Civil society; Centre for 
Governance and Development; Institute of 
Economic Affairs; SUNY team working for 
USAID; Parliament as a whole; Betty Maina; 
Nancy Gitau; Waceke Wachira; Peter Oloo-
Aringo (prominent Parliamentarian); Young 
turks in Parliament in late 1990s
The Speaker of the House (2); Head Clerks in the 
Parliament (2); Parliamentary Initiative Network; 
ICJ; The Law Society of Kenya; SUNY; The 
Institute of Economic Affairs; Kenya Private Sector 
Alliance; Federation of Women Lawyers; USAID
7. Kosovo: Municipal 
Anti- Corruption (04–
06)
Director of Inspectors (9); Partners (8)
Partners (4); The Inspectorates (3); The Mayor (2); 
Director of Inspectors in Suhareka; Director of 
Inspectors in Rahovec; Former director in Peja; 
Director of Podujeva; Head of the Municipality; 
Local government;  Central Government
8. Rwanda: Rapid 
Results (07–09)
Team in general (4); Team leaders (3); Mayor 
(2); Executive Secretary (2); MINALOC (2); 
World Bank and other donors; HIDA; 
university admin; Coach; Government at all 
levels; Rector at University
Executive Secretary at sector (7); Mayors (3); 
District Authorities (3);  MINALOC (2); Ministers; 
President; VUP; World Bank; Gatsebo Vice Mayor 
in charge of social affairs; Coach; Leaders in the 
villages; village and sector authorities; donors; other 
government programmes and departments; Teams; 
Minister of Local Government; minister of state for 
education; University Administration
9. Rwanda Imihigo(07-
09)
Joint Action Forum (3); President Kagame (3); 
Minister of Finance; Minister of Local 
Government; Each sector has its own leaders;  
Mayors (3); Government in general (2); Local level 
citizens in general; Intra-Health ; Elected leaders ; 
NGOs ; District leadership through teams;  55
Ministry of Local Government; Rwanda 
Cooperation; World Bank; UNDP; 
Government leadership as a whole
President; Minister of Local Government;  Prime 
Minster; Rwandan leadership in general;  Joint 
Action Forum; District heads; Ombudsmen and 
directors
10. Sierra Leone: Club 
de Madrid (2007)
50/50 Group (4); Campaign for Good 
Governance (3); Specific civil society leader 
(named);  NDI; Parliament
President; Civil society, Many women's groups; 
50/50; CGG; Female parliamentarians in general
11. Sierra Leone: Rapid 
Results (04-09)
Decentralization Secretariat (5); The team 
leader (2); Local councils (2); Central 
technical team; World Bank; IRCBP; 
Community people
Chairpersons (2); Mayors (2); The team member 
who is now an MP (2);Local level councilors; 
Professionals; central level ministry heads; technical 
facilitators; local authorities; politicians; community 
members (2);  Local government; Decentralization 
Scretariat; World Bank; EU; Chief Administrators 
of Councils; Coaches; Councils as a whole
12. Uganda: Leadership 
Preparation for a 
Government Transition 
(06-07)
Cabinet (5); Head of Public Service (3); 
Cabinet Secretariat (2); Prime Minister; 
President; political leadership (identified as 
separate from cabinet and permanent 
secretaries)
Cabinet (5); President (5); Permanent Secretaries 
(4); Prime Minister (2);  Political leadership 
generally (identified as separate from cabinet and 
permanent secretaries);  Parliament; Public servants 
(broadly); Minister of Public Service; Vice 
President; Head of Public Service; Minister of the 
President; IPAC; Cabinet Secretariat.56
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change takes place.”  Other authors refer to a myriad of factors organizations have to navigate around the 
facilitate change (see articles like Damanpour 1991; Gresov et al. 1993; Haveman 1992; Meyer et al. 1990; 
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xxiii This follows thinking in de Mesquita et al. (2003) and in Grindle and Thomas (1993) and echoes 
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xxiv See North’s (1995) discussion of open access societies to see how inclusionary authority structures are 
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xxv Particularly Armenakis and Bedian (1999), Armenakis and Harris (2002), Armenakis, Harris and Field 
(1999), Burke (2002), Galpin (1996), Gemmill and Smith (1985), Judson (1991), Kotter (1995), and 
Medley and Akan (2008).
xxvi See Bray (1994), Cobb et al. (1995), Clarke et al. (1996) and Lora and Panizza (2002) who all discuss 
the important human element in change.  
xxvii Including Akgün et al. (2007), Argyris (1990), Armenakis and Bedeian (1999), Bandura (1986), 
Isabella (1990), Jaffe, Scott and Tobe (1994), Löwstedt (1993), Schein (1996), and Senge (1992). Lewin 
(1947) himself introduced the idea of action learning as central to organizational change, and Senge et al. 
(1999) tout the importance of having learning define the organizations.
xxviii See Dawson (1994), Kanter et al. (1992) and Pfeffer (1992) as examples.
xxix Evidenced in the continued defense of work like Lewin’s (See Burnes 2004 and Schein 1996).  
xxx See also Armenakis, Harris and Field (1999) and Fernandez and Rainey (2006).
xxxi Drazen and Grilli (1990), Kets de Vries and Balazs (1999), Kotter (1995), Lora and Panizza (2002) and 
Nadler and Nadler (1998).
xxxii Burke-Litwin (1992) and Vollman (1996) both developed tools for diagnosing content challenges 
related to organizational problems, particularly focused on transformational issues.
xxxiii As discussed in Fernandez and Rainey (2006, 168), some theorists downplay the role of agents in 
effecting change (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Scott 2003)
xxxiv Claims like this are evident across the change management literature including Gilley, Dixon and 
Gilley (2008), Kotter (1995), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and even authors 63
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and Poole 1995).
xxxv Including Stogdill (1948), McClelland (1965), Boyatzis (1982), McCall and Lombardo (1983), 
Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991) and Kouzes and Posner (2007).
xxxvi The leader has personal attributes that make him (almost always) an almost supernatural, heroic, 
charismatic quality that inspires trust in followers.
xxxvii Where Nye (2004, 62) describes intellectual stimulation as “broadening followers’ awareness of 
situations and new perspectives” and individualized consideration as “providing support, coaching, and 
developmental experiences to followers rather than treating them as a mere means to an end.”
xxxviii Michael Woolcock’s term.
xxxix This is certainly one way of looking at North’s (1995) open and closed society approach to 
development. 
xl Including the GLOBE study (Den Hartog et al. 1999); Blu et al (2001); Dickson, Den Hartog and 
Mitchelson (2003), Dorfman 91996) and House, Wright and Aditya (1997).
xli See Dorfman & Howell (1988), Dorfman et al. (1997), and Kanungo and Mendonca (1996). 
xlii See Fiedler (1967).
xliii Terry (2002).
xliv See work by the Leaders, Elites and Coalitions team: http://lecrp.org/publications/research_papers_rps
xlv 42 interviews out of 143.
xlvi We had recordings for all the Africa cases and for Afghanistan.
xlvii Recent work suggests that most studies are biased to one or the other (Cinite, Duxbury and Higgins 
2009, 266).
xlviii 58 Interviewees agreed with our prepared statements and 58 agreed that the statement was correct with 
some addition. 20 disagreed with the statement but indicated there were real problems and the rest would 
not answer. We observed how problems with weak service delivery resonated as a prominent and serious 
problem facing Burundi’s coalition government, reinforcing the perspective that rapid results interventions 
addressed a real problem in this context.  